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MDL IMMUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE
NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE
LITIGATION
ROGER MICHALSKI *

Federal multi-district litigation (MDL) suffers from a massive blind spot that
has escaped notice: it only selects cases based on “convenience,” “efficiency,” and
the preservation of judicial resources. The statute does not take into account
broader societal and governmental interests that can trump litigation efficiency
arguments. One way to fix this blind spot is through the new concept of MDL
immunity (a procedural rather than liability immunity). This doctrinal
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innovation would exempt cases by and against government entities from
generalized MDL treatment.
I make the doctrinal argument for MDL immunity informed by original data
collected from hundreds of cases in the federal opiate epidemic litigation, crossreferenced with opioid abuse data from the Center for Disease Control and
American Community Survey data from the Census Bureau.
The doctrinal and empirical contributions of this Article will likely prove useful
in other domains where local governments also struggle to articulate and fund
responses to national crises, including litigation surrounding data privacy, ecigarettes, firearms, predatory lending, obesity, environmental contamination,
global warming, and sanctuary cities.
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INTRODUCTION
The opioid epidemic claimed over 40,000 lives last year.1 Over 2 million
individuals suffer from opioid induced impairment and dependence. 2
Countless other lives are affected and many families and communities
suffer the effects of rampant opioid abuse. 3 In the past, many courts
conceptualized opioid abuse as the individuals’ responsibility. 4 More

1. See Brendan Saloner et al., A Public Health Strategy for the Opioid Crisis, 133 PUB.
HEALTH REPS. 24S (2018) (“The current drug overdose crisis is substantially driven by
opioids, which accounted for 42,000 deaths in 2016, a 5-fold increase since 1999.”);
Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugsabuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/2VN2-J6TL] (“Every day,
more than 130 people in the United States die after overdosing on opioids.”); see also
Nadia Kounang, Opioids Now Kill More People Than Breast Cancer, CNN (Dec. 21, 2017,
12:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/21/health/drug-overdoses-2016-finalnumbers [https://perma.cc/DNB9-SF4V] (“More than 63,600 lives were lost to drug
overdose in 2016 . . . .”); Patricia Mazzei, Opioids, Car Crashes and Falling: The Odds of
Dying in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/
us/opioids-car-crash-guns.html (“[F]or the first time, Americans are more likely to die
of an opioid overdose than in a vehicle crash.”); Barry Meier, Sacklers Directed Efforts to
Mislead Public About OxyContin, Court Filing Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15. 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/health/sacklers-purdue-oxycontinopioids.html (“Since OxyContin came on the market in 1996, more than 200,000
people have died in the United States from overdoses involving prescription
opioids . . . .”). See generally Abbe Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic:
The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 351 (2018).
2. See REBECCA AHRNSBRAK ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES:
RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH (2017),
https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/sma17-5044.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EPU48PG] (estimating that 2.1 million individuals had symptoms of an opioid use disorder
such as impairment and dependence).
3. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST
OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.
gov/files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Cri
sis.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WTB-WCC5 (stating that in 2015, the Council estimated
that the “economic cost of the opioid crisis was $504 billion, or 2.8 percent of GDP,”
including substantial costs for both fatalities and consequences for opioid misuse
among the living); see also First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, Commonwealth
v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-cv-01808 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2019)
(highlighting the cost of opioid addiction for those who do not fatally overdose,
including expensive treatment, inability to work, loss of child custody, and the risk that
children may be born addicted to opioids).
4. See Inge v. McClelland, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1163 (D.N.M. 2017) (concluding
that “[p]laintiffs are barred from asserting their claims because they are based on
[p]laintiffs’ own illegal conduct, acquiring narcotics through fraudulent
prescriptions”); Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 485 (Miss. 2006) (stating
that because the opioid user’s violation of the law was “not merely a condition, but
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recently, a broad coalition of legislators, attorneys, academics,
commentators, and doctors have argued that drug manufacturers
might share a significant portion of the blame for the opioid epidemic
because they intentionally or recklessly encouraged over-prescriptions,
enshrouded the true risks of addiction, and targeted vulnerable
populations.5 In hundreds of lawsuits filed across the nation, numerous
cities, counties, Native-American tribes, states, labor-unions, hospitals,
individuals, and insurance companies are currently invoking these novel
legal arguments against opioid manufacturers and distributors.6 All of the
federal lawsuits concerning the opioid epidemic have been transferred
away from their various courts of origin for coordinated pretrial
proceedings. 7 Currently, over 1900 cases with over 2400 plaintiffs are
in front of a single judge in the Northern District of Ohio. 8 If past

instead an integral and essential part of his case and the contributing cause of his
alleged injury,” his claim was precluded by his own wrongful conduct).
5. See Complaint, State ex rel. DeWine v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. (Ind. Super. Ct.
2018) (“From 2012 through 2016, there were 58 Indiana counties with opioid
prescribing rates greater than 100+ prescriptions per 100 residents.”); First Amended
Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 3 (stating that distributors that fulfill
prescription drug orders to pharmacies failed to question suspicious activity and
monitor the quantity of painkillers shipped to individual pharmacies); Complaint,
State v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 31, 2017) (noting that in 2012,
the level of over-prescription increased when the total number of opioid doses
prescribed to patients in Ohio was 793 million, enough to supply every person in the
state with sixty-eight pills); Katie Zezima, Congressional Report: Drug Companies, DEA
Failed to Stop Flow of Millions of Opioid Pills, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/congressional-report-drug-companiesdea-failed-to-stop-flow-of-millions-of-opioid-pills/2018/12/18/5bc750ee-0300-11e9b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4 (stating that distributors that fulfill prescription drug orders to
pharmacies failed to question suspicious activity and monitor the quantity of
painkillers shipped to individual pharmacies); see also Barry Meier, Sacklers Directed
Efforts to Mislead Public About OxyContin, Court Filing Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/health/sacklers-purdue-oxycontin-opioids.html
(“A confidential 2006 Department of Justice memorandum prepared in connection with
the federal government’s case against Purdue Pharma concluded that the drug maker was
aware of OxyContin’s growing abuse soon after it came onto the market in 1996.”).
6. See Transfer Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2017), ECF No. 1 (stating that plaintiffs in forty-six actions
allege that defendants, manufacturers of opioid drugs, improperly marketed and
distributed opiate medications across the country and failed to prevent diversion of
opiates into illicit channels, thereby contributing to the opioid crisis).
7. See id. Related actions that were filed after the original transfer are now also
transferred as so called “tag-along action[s].” See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1.1(h), 7.1, 7.2 [hereinafter JPML RULES OF
PROCEDURE] (detailing the procedure for new cases to be joined to existing MDL cases).
8. These numbers are derived from my own dataset.
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experience serves, virtually none of these cases will ever return to
where the plaintiffs originally filed these lawsuits. 9
This stunning feat of procedural prowess is possible under 28 USC
§ 1407 (“1407” or “MDL statute” or “federal multidistrict litigation”).
Once a rarely used procedural oddity, cases transferred under the
multidistrict litigation statute now account for roughly a third of the
federal docket. 10 Use of section 1407 is controversial and often fiercely
contested because it radically re-balances the litigation opportunities and
vulnerabilities of plaintiffs and defendants.11 Instead of defending in district
courts all over the country, a defendant only has to defend in one
proceeding. Instead of facing many plaintiffs with many strategies and
approaches to discovery and motion practice, the defendant faces a steering
committee of plaintiff attorneys selected by the judge who, often, is focused
on protecting judicial resources and encourages broad settlements.12
9. Only around 3% of MDL cases ever come back. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Long
Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1206 (2018) (“The reality of
MDL practice, as everyone understands, is that the cases almost never exit the MDL
proceeding. They are almost always—in fact, over 97 percent of the time—resolved in
the MDL court, either by dispositive motion or through mass-settlement agreement.”);
see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 679 (2013)
(noting that in practice, judges increasingly refuse to allow plaintiffs to return to their
original districts for trial); Emery Lee et al., The Expanding Role of Multidistrict
Consolidation in Federal Civil Litigation: An Empirical Investigation 15 (July 10, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1443375 [https://perma.cc/N8XD-LU2E] (noting that “cases that are transferred as
part of an MDL generally do not return to the transferor court”).
10. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1407 FISCAL YEAR (2017), https://
www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_L
itigation-FY-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X65-M7D6] (noting annual data of cases
transferred pursuant to § 1407); see also Jay Tidmarsh & Daniela Peinado Welsh, The
Future of Multidistrict Litigation, 51 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2–3),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3255623 [https://perma.cc/4EGV-UQVG] (describing the
MDL process as “arguably the central feature in federal litigation” and stating that more
than one third of all federal civil lawsuits are in MDL proceedings).
11. See DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152–53, 155 (D.
Mass. 2006) (“Some, believing that any settlement is preferable to any trial, may
consider [the pursuit of settlement without offering a trial] a desirable outcome. In
actuality, however, this marginalization of juror fact-finding perversely and sharply
skews the MDL bargaining process in favor of defendants . . . . The litigant who refuses
to settle can never get back to his home court to go before a local jury unless the
transferee judge agrees. Once trial is no longer a realistic alternative, bargaining shifts
in ways that inevitably favor the defense.”).
12. See Tidmarsh & Peinado Welsh, supra note 10, at 11–12 (“Appointment of counsel
also limits the claims and arguments of plaintiffs, making it easier for transferee judges to
generate broadly applicable procedural, substantive, or evidentiary rulings that can
channel the litigation into a global summary judgment or settlement.”).
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Multidistrict litigation faces numerous critics,13 but the opioid epidemic
litigation highlights a problem that has largely escaped notice: 1407 only
selects cases where “common questions of fact” are present and where
transfer serves the vague goals of furthering “the convenience of parties
and witnesses” and “promote[s] the just and efficient conduct” of
transferred cases.14 The MDL statute does not test for broader interests.
Such broader interests might be at play in many instances. Typically, the
belief is that other interests are subordinate to the larger goal of efficient
adjudication and the parsimonious use of judicial resources.
However, in the context of the opioid epidemic (and litigation like
it) there are special and strong additional considerations at play. First,
the opioid epidemic is of greater national concern than many other
MDL cases. 15 Second, the plaintiffs in this MDL (mostly counties and
cities) are representing sections of the public at large and are trying to
protect their government police powers. 16 Third, the plaintiffs here are
unusually heterogeneous, ranging in population, wealth, litigation
resources and experience, governing powers and responsibilities, and
varying exposure to the opioid epidemic (early/late, low/high, legally
prescribed/illegally obtained). This extreme variation sets the opioid
epidemic plaintiffs apart from those in many other MDL cases where
similarly situated individual consumers allege more comparable
harm. 17 Fourth, many plaintiffs here stress the importance of public
disclosure as a litigation goal to educate the public they represent. 18
13. See generally Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation
Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1167–68 (2006); Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules:
The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 339–40 (2008); Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 86–87 (2017); Linda S.
Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511,
541 (2013); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due
Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
15. See generally Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic, 46 J. L.
Med. & Ethics 351 (2018).
16. The causes of action range dramatically from a few federal causes of action to
a broad array of state causes of action (choice of law questions are unaltered by 28
U.S.C. § 1407 transfers and the cases from around the country thus typically retain the
law of those jurisdictions). Summarizing and simplifying a great deal, many plaintiffs
seek help for overburdened institutions by recovering costs associated with treatment
of opioid addiction and associated costs of public safety measures.
17. Nora Freeman Engstrom & Michelle M. Mello, Suing the Opioid Companies,
STAN. L. SCH. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/08/30/q-and-a-withmello-and-engstrom [https://perma.cc/UC9P-S9Z6].
18. See The Commonwealth’s Pre-Hearing Memorandum for the Hearing Set for
January 25, 2019 at 5, ex. 1 at 4, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1884-cv01808 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Commonwealth’s Pre-Hearing
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Fifth, the legal theories invoked by the current plaintiffs in the opioid
cases are novel and complex 19 and implicate a difficult debate about
the nature and causes of addiction, 20 the role of intervening causality, 21
preemption, 22 the interplay of criminal and civil sanctions, 23 measuring
Memorandum](“The Attorney General is the Commonwealth’s lawyer, and the people
of Massachusetts should be allowed to see the allegations brought on their behalf. The
Defendants’ deceptive sales tactics injured people across the Commonwealth, and the
people of Massachusetts deserve to know the truth.”) (“Revealing the truth about
Purdue’s misconduct is important to achieve justice and make sure deception like
Purdue’s never happens again.”). See generally Barry Meier, Opioid Makers Are the Big
Winners in Lawsuit Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/12/26/opinion/opioids-lawsuits-purdue-pharma.html (“Forcing the opioid
industry to reveal the truth will likely take years, but it could prevent a similar
catastrophe in the future.”).
19. For example, a number of plaintiffs argue that the behavior of the opioid
manufacturers constitutes a public nuisance. Complaint at 66–69, State v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 31, 2017); see also Opinion & Order at 38–39, In
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2017),
ECF No. 1203 (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have contributed to the addiction of
millions of Americans to these prescription opioids and to the foreseeable result that
many of those addicted would turn to street drugs. While these allegations do not fit
neatly into the legal theories chosen by Plaintiffs, they fit nevertheless.”).
20. See Nicolas Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S.C. L. REV. 637, 652 (2019)
(questioning “a simple cause and effect model to explain a far more complex problem”).
21. See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556–57 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (concluding that the “read and heed” presumption that a user would have read
and heeded a drug’s warnings or instructions is not applicable in cases that involve a
“learned intermediary,” such as a prescribing physician).
22. See Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F.3d 281, 293 (6th Cir.
2015) (concluding that because the FDA approved the birth control patch that
plaintiff alleged caused her stroke, her claims of pre-approval and post-approval design
defect claims were preempted). See generally Michael R. Abrams, Note, Renovations
Needed: The FDA’s Floor/Ceiling Framework, Preemption, and the Opioid Epidemic, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 143, 150 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s holdings allowing federal
administrative standards to preempt state tort law permits pharmaceutical companies
to avoid internalizing the public health costs of opioids).
23. See Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, Doctors in Seven States Charged with Prescribing
Pain Killers for Cash, Sex, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/doctors-in-five-states-charged-with-prescribingpain-killers-for-cash-sex/2019/04/17/7670d20e-607e-11e9-9ff2-abc984dc9eec
(“Dozens of medical professionals in seven states were charged Wednesday with
participating in the illegal prescribing of more than 32 million pain pills, including
doctors who prosecutors said traded sex for prescriptions and a dentist who
unnecessarily pulled teeth from patients to justify giving them opioids.”); see also Hon.
Lawrence K. Marks, The Unified Court System’s Response to the Opioid Epidemic in New York,
11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 28, 32, 34, 36, 56 (2017) (describing New York state’s Unified
Court System, in which drug court officials work in tandem with social services and
treatment providers and criminal justice professionals to help addicts recover instead
of serving prisons sentences, which generally exacerbate addictions); Cara O’Connor,
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harm, 24 local powers in the midst of a paralyzed national crisis, and the
intractable costs of a drugged society. 25 Such new and complex legal
theories can best be tested and developed over time if diverse advocates
push for them, diverse defendants point out their flaws, and diverse
audiences evaluate them.26 Litigating such issues in a single forum in front
of a single judge will likely underdevelop the factual record, underdevelop
the legal theories, and underdevelop democratic legitimacy.
All of this suggests a heightened value for dispersed local adjudication,
in a timely manner, on the merits, targeted at the specific and
individualized harm suffered in that place, controlled by that plaintiff
(e.g., targeting discovery to their litigation goals), and which provides
resident witnesses a chance to participate in front of a local judge and
jury that are mindful of local conditions and sensibilities. This is the
exact opposite of what the MDL process typically promises and has
actually delivered in this case thus far.
We can gain some sense of what the road not taken might look like
thanks to the accident of non-removability. 27 While most opioid cases
were either filed in federal court or removed to federal court and thus
Comment, A Guiding Hand or a Slap on the Wrist: Can Drug Courts Be the Solution to
Maternal Opioid Use?, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 106 (2019) (arguing that drug
courts must undergo reforms in order to better adjudicate cases involving pregnant
women addicted to opioids and better help pregnant addicts).
24. See Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local
Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061,
1107 (2019) (conducting a study of the opioid crisis using “unstructured, qualitative
interviews with local government department heads and other service providers to
determine the extent to which their opioid costs could be readily captured”).
25. See Pain Relief Most Reported Reason for Misuse of Opioid Pain Relievers, NAT’L INST.
ON DRUG ABUSE (July 31, 2017), https://www.drugabuse.gov/news-events/newsreleases/2017/07/pain-relief-most-reported-reason-misuse-opioid-pain-relievers
[https://perma.cc/4TGZ-WT87] (citing data collected from the 2015 National Survey
on Drug Use and Health, which estimated that 92 million people in the United States
used opioid pain relievers in 2016).
26. See Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public
Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 922 (2018) (“[T]here may be
systemic benefits from multiple decisions by multiple judges arising from arguments
by multiple lawyers.”); Melissa Mortazavi, Tort As Democracy: Lessons from the Food Wars,
57 ARIZ. L. REV. 929, 931 (2015) (“Tort suits bring forth new ideas, create new forums
for debate, force fact-finding, and increase back and forth dialogue amongst the public
and private institutional actors to develop sound law and policy.”).
27. For example, Purdue Pharma Inc. is incorporated in New York with its
principal place of business in Connecticut. Diversity-only suits filed in the state courts
of those states are non-removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) (“A civil action
otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of
this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).
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brought within the broad transfer powers of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML or the “Panel”), a few cases remained in
state courts and thus cannot be transferred to the federal MDL. 28 For
example, one opioid case was filed in Oklahoma state court and became
non-removable, seemingly because of a mistake by counsel for the
defendants. 29 The case has remained in state court despite subsequent
efforts to remove to federal court and invoke 1407. The Oklahoma case
was filed around the same time as hundreds of others now in the federal
opioid MDL. While the federal cases appear years away from deep and
individualized discovery and an on-the-merits adjudication, the case in
Oklahoma state court went to trial in May 2019.30
None of this is to suggest anything derogatory about the MDL
process in general or the MDL judge here in particular. However, I
argue that the opioid epidemic cases (and cases like it) are not a good
fit for MDL treatment and teach us about massive blind spots in the
MDL statute and doctrine. There is currently no way in MDL litigation
to account for powerful societal and governmental interests that trump
litigation efficiency arguments.
One way to fix this blind spot is through the new concept of “MDL
immunity.” This doctrinal innovation is one of the main contributions
of this Article. I propose that cases by and against government entities
must be exempted from generalized MDL treatment. In contrast to other
immunities that block liability, this is an immunity from a particular
procedural device, namely transfers of cases to a multidistrict litigation
proceeding. The best way to accomplish this is through a one-sentence
amendment to the MDL statute (Appendix A). Something close to it could
also be accomplished without Congressional action by modifying JPML
doctrine or changed practices by MDL judges. However, these alternative
approaches would not be as formalized and predictable as legislative action.
28. But cf. American Law Institute, Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and
Analysis, 217–18 (1994) (arguing for “intersystem consolidation” that would allow
transfers from state to federal courts for consolidation purposes). Also, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(2) (2012) limits removal of cases (and therefore transfer of cases under
1407) where any “defendant[] is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”
However, most plaintiffs would like to assert federal claims that puts them beyond the
requirements of 1441(b)(2).
29. Defendants stipulated to non-removability in exchange for more time to answer the
complaint and they requested removal after the time allowed in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
Stipulation at 2, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 27, 2017).
30. Andrew M. Harris & Jef Feeley, Oklahoma Narrows Opioid Suit Before Trial in J&J,
Teva Case, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-04-04/oklahoma-narrows-opioid-lawsuit-before-trial-in-j-j-teva-case
[https://perma.cc/KQ4V-T6AJ].
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I make the argument for MDL immunity informed by data collected
from state and federal courts on hundreds of cases, cross-referenced
with opioid abuse data from the Center for Disease Control 31 and
Census and American Community Survey data. Together, such data
provide a broader lens to capture the extent and limitations of the
federal opiate litigation. Despite the importance of the opioid MDL,
no research has yet examined who actually is participating in the case
and which communities are left out from partaking and leadership.
The data shows the predominance of atypical leaders in the MDL and
normatively relevant absences.
Section 1 will provide an empirically informed description of the
federal opioid MDL with a particular focus on the plaintiffs in the case.
Section 2 builds on this account to highlight doctrinal and normative
concerns that the opioid MDL raises. Section 3 explains the new concept
of MDL immunity and how it would address numerous normative
concerns and contribute to a more democratic resolution of the opioid
epidemic and cases like it.
The doctrinal and empirical contributions of this Article will likely
prove useful in other domains as well where local governments struggle
to articulate and fund responses to national crises, including litigation
surrounding firearms, e-cigarettes, predatory lending, obesity,
environmental contamination, global warming, sanctuary cities, and
national emergencies declared by the President. 32
I. WHO AND WHO NOT
This Section provides an empirically informed perspective of the
federal opioid MDL.33 It focuses on the plaintiffs in the case to highlight
the doctrinal incongruity between the MDL statute and the actual
configuration of this case.

31. Thanks to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Association
for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS) for providing vital
statistic micro-data.
32. See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1286 (2018) (discussing
how cities bring suits as plaintiffs in order to redress large-scale harms such as gun
violence and opioid addiction); Eli Savit, States Empowering Plaintiff Cities, 52 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 581, 584 (2019) (“Cities . . . can provide much-needed resources to
augment states’ litigative capacities in areas such as consumer protection,
environmental protection, and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.”).
33. See also Emery G. Lee et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination,
12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 211–12 (2015) (noting that despite the importance
of the MDL process, there is little research on it).
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My account begins with an explanation of data and methods. I collected
data on hundreds of cases and cross-referenced them with opioid abuse
data and Census data. I then geo-located government entity plaintiffs (the
vast majority of plaintiffs in the opioid MDL). This allowed me to highlight
connections and discontinuities between plaintiffs in real space and in
relation to variables important for understanding the opioid litigation.34
The data reveals that the government plaintiffs in this case are far from
homogenous and comprehensively selected.35 Early filers in particular are
atypical.36 They clump together geographically and represent communities
that tend to be affected earlier and harder by the opioid epidemic than
other jurisdictions.37 These early filers also tend to be poorer, less diverse,
and less educated than other jurisdictions.38 They have higher numbers of
those who are government-insured and those supported by government
assistance programs than later filers and other peers.39
The atypicality of early filers is important because only early filers were
present when the initial transfer motion was argued, the scope of the MDL
34. This account is non-causal in nature. My aim is to describe and characterize a
complex case to highlight key aspects that are easily overlooked if we focus on motions,
opinions, and doctrine alone.
35. See infra Sections I.B, I.F.
36. See Transfer Order, supra note 6, at A1–A4 (listing the original forty-six filers
seeking to consolidate their claims via an MDL action).
37. See id.; see also NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, KY. OPIOID SUMMARY 2 (2019),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/21961/kentucky-opioid-summary
[https://perma.cc/4KC3-JPLQ] (noting that the rate of opioid-related deaths in
Kentucky is nearly twice the national average); NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, OHIO
OPIOID SUMMARY 2 (2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/21980/ohioopioid-summary [https://perma.cc/JHV7-T5GC] (noting that in 2017, Ohio had the
second highest rate of opioid-related drug overdose deaths in the nation); NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE, W. VA. OPIOID SUMMARY 2 (2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/
pdf/21991/west-virginia-opioid-summary [https://perma.cc/8SNA-XP23] (noting that
the state has the highest rate of opioid-related drug overdose deaths in the nation).
38. See QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/geo/chart/WV,OH,KY/INC110217 [https://perma.cc/WN2S-SBFV] (providing
data for median household income in 2017 dollars); QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/geo/chart/WV,OH,KY/EDU685217
[https://perma.cc/EV8C-TDBG] (providing data for percent of population older than
twenty-five years with a Bachelor’s degree or higher); QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept.
13, 2018), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/geo/chart/WV,OH,KY/ IPE120217
[https://perma.cc/CL93-LFAQ] (providing data for percent of persons in poverty);
Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
geo/chart/WV,OH,KY/RHI125218 [https://perma.cc/ EX6V-9PQS] (providing data
for percentage of white people).
39. See QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/geo/chart/WV,OH,KY/HCN010212#qf-headnote-c [https://perma.cc/
6K6P-QDUQ] (providing data for total health care and social assistance receipts/revenue).
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determined, and lead counsel proposed and selected. Later filers are in the
MDL all the same but did not have a voice in these important stages of the
case and continue to be excluded from pre-trial litigation decisions.40
Beyond atypical, early filers do not include all jurisdictions that are
similarly situated. While three neighboring counties might be virtually
indistinguishable in terms of opioid abuse patterns, demographics,
government structure, and economics, one county might be an early filer in
the MDL case and have its attorney selected as lead attorney; another county
might be a late filer with little or no power to affect the direction of the MDL;
and a third county might not have initiated any lawsuit whatsoever.
Doctrinally this is understandable: there is nothing in the MDL statute that
requires these three counties to behave alike even when they are affected by
the opioid MDL in a similar way.41 However, normatively, this is troubling.
The following sections will establish the empirical foundations that are the
bedrock of later doctrinal and normative arguments.
A. Data
This Section presents a broad overview of the membership in the opioid
MDL. The case is a beast. Currently, it is comprised of roughly 1900 cases with
more transferred every week by the JPML.42 Many cases include multiple
plaintiffs, typically many defendants, and many causes of action. The docket
sheet currently contains more than 2600 entries.43 There are also dozens of
amicus curiae44 and a handful of intervenors.45

40. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). The lack of required consistency can be contrasted
with, say, 23(b)(2) class action treatment.
42. The JPML decides on whether to consolidate, designates a MDL judge for the
matter, designates a district for MDL proceedings, and decided whether/when to
remand cases. The JPML does not decide or influence the MDL proceedings directly
by, for example, weighing in on orders, opinions, and judgments. See In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 421 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (“The Panel has
neither the power nor the disposition to direct the transferee court in the exercise of
its powers and discretion in pretrial proceedings.”).
43. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio filed
Dec. 8, 2017).
44. Id. (listing amicus curiae on the docket sheet, mostly hospitals and states).
45. Most of the intervenors are newspapers that seek to publicize information
utilized in the litigation that is currently shielded from public view by protective orders. Id.;
see also Kevin Koeninger, Newspaper Argues for Release of Data in Opioid Case, Courthouse News
Serv. (May 2, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/newspaper-argues-for-release-ofdata-in-opioid-case [https://perma.cc/4HGW-K8N8] (documenting the Washington Post’s
attempt to obtain government data).
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To gain a better understanding of the composition of this MDL, I began
by identifying all member cases transferred by the JPML.46 I then handcoded docket identification information, plaintiff names, plaintiff types,
original filing courts, original filing dates, and transfer dates.47
This dataset provides an initial snapshot of how many plaintiffs are
in the MDL, when they originally filed their suits, when their cases were
transferred, and what type of plaintiffs predominate. To gain a better
understanding of the litigation needs and vulnerabilities of these plaintiffs, I
then cross-referenced the MDL data with two other data sources.
The first data source is mortality data from the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 48
Access to this data is conditional on adherence to data sharing restrictions
and NCHS data suppression standards that limit some reporting on the
data.49 Vital statistics micro-data provides an indication of the timing and
extent of the opioid epidemic in different communities based on fatal
overdoses.50 This data is not without problems and limitations, but it provides
46. MDLs are a moving target, with cases added from time to time and, potentially,
remanded and dismissed. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804DAP (N.D. Ohio filed Dec. 8, 2017) (indicating on the docket sheet that third-party
defendant King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was dismissed on December 17, 2018). I
continuously collected data on cases at the point in time when they were transferred.
Also, a few cases are part of the MDL even though they were never transferred by the
JPML. Some plaintiffs are located in the Northern District of Ohio (where the MDL
takes place). They filed in their home jurisdiction and were included in the MDL
without transfer. A few other plaintiffs, though not located in Ohio, decided to file
directly in the Northern District of Ohio rather than their home districts. They too
were included in this MDL without JPML transfers. See generally Andrew Bradt, The
Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 759, 759 (2012) (“In direct filing, plaintiffs bypass the transfer process and file
their cases directly into an MDL court.”).
47. I focus on when the transfer into the MDL court actually occurs rather than
when there is a motion for transfer, the JPML considers the transfer, the JPML issues
a conditional transfer order, or the JPML transfers. Oftentimes all of these events
happen in close proximity.
48. This data includes the National Center for Health Statistics’ Vital Statistics,
Mortality, All County (micro-data) 2000–2017, as compiled from data provided by the
fifty-seven vital statistics jurisdictions through the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program.
49. A note of caution to future legal researchers: the process for obtaining this data
took ten months from request to receipt of data, including multiple rounds of review.
50. Deaths are, of course, not the sole indication of the extent of the opioid
epidemic. As indicated earlier, many people suffer from opioid addiction without ever
overdosing and dying. However, they often do so in private and it is difficult to collect
data on, for example, families torn apart by opioid addiction. As such, this Article uses
opioid deaths as a crude but clear, well-documented, and important proxy for the
timing and extent of the opioid epidemic. Beyond the proxy nature of this variable, it
is also important to highlight the risk of bias. Death as a result of opioid overdoses
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important and, to my knowledge, unmatched detail on where and when
deaths occur in the United States. This data allowed me to test, for example,
whether the MDL plaintiffs mostly consist of counties that were affected
earlier or more recently by the opioid epidemic.
The second data source is the U.S. Census and the American Community
Survey.51 This data is used to characterize the counties and cities involved in
the MDL with a focus on population numbers, incomes and earnings, age,
diversity, household size, presence of veterans, education levels, employment
numbers, health insurance coverage (private & public), geographic mobility,
poverty, food-stamp recipients, public assistance recipients, and disabled52
and vulnerable populations.53 Put crudely, this data allowed me to query, for
example, whether only rich or poor counties partake in the opioid MDL.
Merged together, these three data sources provide a novel way to
characterize who was an early filer in the opioid MDL (and thus could
shape its scope and leadership), who filed later, and who did not file at all.
The data shows the predominance of atypical leaders in the MDL and
normatively relevant absences.
B. Who
To gain a better overview of this massive case, we can begin by
characterizing the types of plaintiffs in the MDL. 54 While the JPML order
creating this MDL focused on government litigants, it is not limited to

might not be evenly distributed across all people and communities that grapple with
opioid addiction. For example, it might be the case that well-educated individuals who
are addicted to opioids overdose more or less frequently than others. This could bias
results significantly. Causality chains are extremely complicated in this area and
beyond the scope of this Article. The analysis assumes, without knowing, that such
biasing factors are comparatively mild.
51. American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/programs-surveys/acs [https://perma.cc/844U-9G6G].
52. Disabled individuals for ACS purposes include individuals with hearing, visual,
cognitive, ambulatory, self-care, and independent living disabilities. How Disability Data
Are Collected from the American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/health/disability/guidance/data-collection-acs.html
[https://perma.cc/E2TS-WZBM] (last revised Oct. 17, 2017).
53. “Vulnerable populations” can be defined in many ways. For the purposes of
this Article, I focus on a z-score index of young people (under five years of age), old
people (above sixty-four years of age), and disabled individuals.
54. Unless otherwise indicated, I count each plaintiff separately even if they joined
together in a case. For example, two counties might initiate a lawsuit together as co-plaintiffs
before the JPML transfers their case to the opioid MDL. I count that as two plaintiff counties in
part because different types of litigants frequently join together in one opioid lawsuit, thus
creating difficult categorization problems with case-based counting methods.
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them.55 This Section thus begins with a headcount of the types of plaintiffs
in this case, asking whether government litigants still predominate. Within
the subset of government litigants, different types of government entities at
different levels have varying responsibilities and abilities. This Section thus
also inquires at what level the brunt of the government litigants govern.
Table 1. Types of Plaintiffs in MDL #2804, National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, as of 2/14/2019
Type
Federal
State
County
Municipality
Sub-Municipality
Union
Business
Non-profit
Individual
Tribe
Total

Number
0
45 56
871
506
34
28
119
37
129
81
1850

Percentage
0
2.4
47.0
27.3
1.8
1.5
6.4
2
7.0
4.4
100%

Note: “Counties” include county-equivalents like Louisiana Parishes.
“Municipalities” include cities, towns, townships, villages and the like. “SubMunicipalities” include city police departments, jails, hospitals, and schools. As
such, this category includes government structures subsidiary to counties and cities.
Future researchers might desire a more fine-grained distinction but, given the low
numbers, that seemed unnecessary in the context of this study. “Union” includes
sub-units of unions and related entities, such as union retirement funds. “Tribe”
includes state and federally recognized tribes. The percentage might not add up to
100% because of rounding above.

Table 1 makes clear that the brunt of the plaintiffs in this MDL are
counties and municipalities (about ¾ of all litigants). The federal
government and a large number of affected federal agencies could be

55. Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 3–4 (“Although all of the cases on the motion
before us involve claims brought by political subdivisions, we have been notified of
potential tag-along actions brought by individuals, consumers, hospitals and third party
payors. As reflected in our questions at oral argument, this litigation might evolve to include
additional categories of plaintiffs and defendants, as well as different types of claims.”).
56. This number might be misleading because it does not indicate that forty-five
separate states are in this MDL as plaintiffs. Instead, it is a handful of states that
repeatedly join other government units (typically counties) in their lawsuits.
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part of the MDL; nothing in 1407 or JPML rules prevents the inclusion
of federal government litigants as plaintiffs or defendants. 57 The U.S.
Department of Justice briefly considered joining the case and asked
the court for additional time to consider this option in light of the
massive and multifaceted impact of the opioid crisis on federal services,
federal programs, and federal law enforcement activities. 58 Ultimately,
the federal government decided to participate only in an amicus
capacity 59 and as a non-party discovery target. 60
While not a type of litigant, this is also a good time to briefly explore
the representative status of litigants within putative class actions. An
MDL is not a class action 61 though it has features that resemble class
actions. 62 Within the MDL, any plaintiff could theoretically move for

57. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
58. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 1–2, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2018), ECF No.
161 (“[T]he United States respectfully asks that the Court afford it a period of thirty
days to evaluate whether to participate in these proceedings at this stage.”).
59. United States’ Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Participate in
Settlement Discussions and as Friend of the Court at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2018), ECF No. 212-1 (discussing
the United States’ determination to be a “friend of the Court” after reviewing the
applicable federal statutes, the federal government’s numerous other opioid efforts,
and its statutory authority to recover funds from previously paid medical treatments).
60. The federal Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) maintains a database
of opioid distribution channel use called the “ARCOS/DADS database.” Much of the
litigation activity in the first year of the opioid MDL has centered on who can get access to
this data, when, and how they are allowed to use the data. See Order Re: ARCOS/DADS
Database at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 2, 2018), ECF No. 112 (“There is a legitimate need for Plaintiffs to obtain this data,
but the Court believes that production must be tailored—perhaps through a protective
order—in a way to address the DEA’s concerns regarding breadth, years in question,
potential interference in investigations and enforcement actions . . . .”).
61. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
389, 391 (2011) (explaining that an MDL “strip[s] away” the usual class action protections).
62. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT.
REV. 183, 215 (noting that in mass harm cases, the term “quasi-class” refers to the
aggregation of related cases usually overseen by an MDL court); Richard A. Nagareda,
Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1113–14, 1151 (2010)
(suggesting that some cases be combined through procedural “hybridization,” which
is the “combination of individual actions with some manner of centralizing
mechanism,” and further describing multidistrict litigation’s role in combining cases);
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing MultiDistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 107, 110 (2010)
(utilizing three MDL settlements and four common MDL practices to study the “quasiclass action approach” to MDL case management).
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class certification. 63 Currently only a few plaintiffs have sought class
certification. They include individual opioid users, 64 hospitals, 65
unions, 66 and parents and legal guardians of infants born with neonatal
abstinence syndrome resulting from in vitro opioid exposure. 67 The
court has made no indication that it will permit class certification to
move forward any time soon.
C. When
When created, this MDL consisted of forty-six cases. 68 Since then, it
has grown to almost 1900, with more cases added week after week. This
Section examines this growth and inquires into the timing of new
actions filed and transferred. Timing is relevant for numerous reasons,
chief among them is the ability to control litigation. For example,
plaintiffs who filed their opioid cases after October 2017 did not have
an opportunity to argue to the JPML whether these cases were suitable
for MDL treatment, where the MDL should be situated (the transferee
district), or which federal judge should be in charge of all of these
cases (the transferee judge). Later filers were, by and large, stuck with
decisions that they had no opportunity to shape. 69
Similarly, one of the first orders of business once the MDL was
created was to select lead attorneys. Only they have the power to

63. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1695 (2017)
(“More than seventy-five percent of MDLs involve class actions.”).
64. See Complaint, Lewis v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:17-op-45076 (W.D. Ark.
June 29, 2017).
65. See Class Action Complaint, Sw. Miss. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Amerisourcebergen
Drug Corp., No. 1:17-CV-145-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. Nov. 30, 2017).
66. See Class Action Complaint, United Food & Commercial Workers Health & Welfare
Fund of N.E. Pa. v. Purdue Pharma, LP, No. 1:17-op-45177 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2017).
67. See Class Action Complaint, Wood v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:18-op-45264
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2018) (filing as a putative class representative for children who had
“[p]renatal exposure to opioids [that] cause severe withdrawal symptoms and lasting
developmental impacts”); Shahla M. Jilani et al., Evaluation of State-Mandated Reporting
of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome—Six States, 2013–2017, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 6, 6 (2019) (“NAS is a drug withdrawal syndrome that most commonly
occurs among infants after in utero exposure to opioids, although other substances
have also been associated with NAS.”). See generally Catherine Saint Louis, A Tide of
Opioid-Dependent Newborns Forces Doctors to Rethink Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/health/opioid-addiction-babies.html.
68. Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 1.
69. But cf. id. at 4 (“We will address whether to include specific actions or claims
through the conditional transfer order process.”).

2019]

MDL IMMUNITY

193

litigate, and they are in charge of negotiating global settlements. 70
Plaintiffs who filed after December 2017 could not have their attorney
selected as lead attorney. Also, steering committees and related organs
do not have to be static but display a tendency toward the status quo.
Simplifying a great deal, litigants whose cases were in the MDL early
have a far greater chance of having their attorney in a position of
control and power than late filers. Figure 1 presents a week-by-week
count of filings.
Figure 1. Weekly Number of Filings of Cases in MDL #2804

Notes: Each vertical bar represents the number of filings in a given week. Cases are
counted for the purposes of Figure 1 when they were originally filed or originally
removed to federal court, rather than when they were ordered transferred to the MDL
or actually transferred. The first vertical line indicates when the initial 1407 motion
was filed. The second vertical line indicates when the JPML created this MDL and
transferred the first set of cases.

Figure 1 illustrates how late filers numerically predominate over the
original plaintiffs in this MDL. Most cases now in this MDL were filed
after the order to centralize. Figure 1 also provides vague hints at filing
incentives. If many would-be plaintiffs sat on the sidelines and waited
for the 1407 motion to succeed, we would expect a dramatic influx of
70. See D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2175, 2176 (2017) (noting that the negotiating parties who create a global settlement
in an MDL are the defendant and the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs, who are appointed
by the MDL judge to the plaintiffs’ steering committee).
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cases right after December 2017. 71 That is not the case here. But
neither is the flipside. If most potential opioid litigation plaintiffs
detested MDL treatment, we would expect a drop of filings after
December 2017.72 That is also not the case here. Instead, the data
demonstrates a steady increase and eventual platooning of cases over the
next twelve-month period (that might be due, in part, to more awareness
about opioid litigation rather than appetite or distaste for MDL
proceedings). The median number of days between filing/removal of a
case and completed transfer to the Northern District of Ohio is twenty-four
days.73 This suggests that the JPML is highly efficient at detecting and
transferring tag-along cases.
Beyond overall numbers, I am also interested in who filed when. As the
previous section indicated, the majority of plaintiffs in this MDL represent
different kinds of governments, mostly counties, cities, and tribes. Figure 2
examines filing patterns across these three groups that account for more
than three-fourths of all plaintiffs in this MDL.

71. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and
State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867 (2000) (examining the view
that some case aggregation invites plaintiffs “who would never have brought a ‘real’
case anyway”); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos
Cases: Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans
That Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271, 284 (2003) (“Rather than
making cases go away, [efficient complex litigation procedures invite] new ones.”).
72. It is virtually certain that new filings will be included in the MDL as tag-along cases.
73. This number is derived from my own calculations. Typically, the JPML orders
transfers a few days before the docket is transferred and the transfer completed. Parties
thus know typically within mere days from filing an action or having their state court
action removed that their case will end up in the MDL proceedings.
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Figure 2. Weekly Number of Filings of Cases in MDL #2804 for County
Litigants (Panel 1), Municipal Litigants (Panel 2), and Tribes (Panel 3).

Figure 2 demonstrates that counties are not just numerically
predominant; they also were the most common early filers. Tribes, in
contrast, filed their lawsuits later. Not a single tribal litigant was present
when the initial 1407 motion was made, argued, or decided.74 Similarly,
no tribal plaintiffs were in the room when lead counsel for the MDL was
selected. 75 This is troubling. Insofar as these different governments have
different sovereign powers, resources, responsibilities, exposure, and
vulnerability to the opioid epidemic, this filing pattern paired with
early and consequential litigation decisions suggests that entire
74. See Stacy L. Leeds, Beyond an Emergency Declaration: Tribal Governments and the
Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1025–26 (2019) (noting that none of the
individual actions initially transferred to the MDL were tribal lawsuits).
75. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio
filed Dec. 08, 2017) (showing on the docket that Special Masters were appointed two
weeks before the first tribal plaintiffs filed their appearance).
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categories of litigants might not be well-represented when it comes to
making decisions about this litigation. 76
Perhaps in response, and as suggested by the JPML, 77 the presiding
judge in the opioid MDL created a separate track for tribal plaintiffs. 78
Though a step in the right direction, this track cannot solve more
fundamental problems. The track for tribal cases is controlled by two
tribal plaintiffs. 79 They are able to litigate, within set boundaries, their
own cases. The tribal litigants not selected for this leadership in this
track still have no control or voice about litigation decisions. For
example, they are powerless to shape discovery requests or pre-trial
strategy. These decisions are made by lead counsel and the attorneys
for the two tribal cases that were selected before many of these
plaintiffs ever filed suit.
These filing patterns suggest that a few litigants that filed early,
mostly counties and some cities, might have a disproportionate voice
in litigating this MDL. This raises the question of who these litigants
are and how they compare to litigants that filed later and governments
that never filed suit. The following sections turn to these questions.
D. Where
One way to get an initial and intuitive sense of who the primary
government litigants are is to geolocate them. Geography is
information-rich, multifaceted, and underutilized. Representing
litigation in real space can be a useful way to explore connections and
discontinuities. I begin with a look at counties (the most common
plaintiff type), highlighting all counties in the continuous United
States that are currently in the MDL. 80

76. Some might also insist on differently-situated lawyers. See generally Melissa
Mortazavi, Blind Spot: The Inadequacy of Neutral Partisanship, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
16, 18, 21 (2015) (discussing the importance of overlap in identifying traits—such as
race and gender—between class members and their legal representatives because such
commonalities can increase trust, empathy, and effective communication between
plaintiffs and their counsel).
77. Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 3 (“The transferee judge might find it useful,
for example, to establish different tracks for the different types of parties or claims.”).
78. See Case Management Order Number Six, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2018), ECF No. 770 (setting briefing
deadlines for two Indian Tribe cases).
79. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio
filed Dec. 8, 2017) (showing docket listing the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and Blackfeet
Tribe as the individual tribal plaintiffs).
80. As such, Figure 3 does not include filings from Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S.
territories (principally a handful of municipalities in Puerto Rico).
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Figure 3. County Governments in MDL #2804

Figure 3 is a reminder about the breadth and depth of this MDL. It
highlights just how many county governments are involved in this
MDL. Figure 3 also presents many puzzles. Why are most of the
counties of some states (e.g., Wisconsin) in this MDL while no counties
from other states are present? Even in states where many counties filed
suit, why did others not? We will explore some of these questions in
later sections. 81 Before tackling those questions, I return to a previous
question about early and later filers: who are the early filers identified
in the previous section? Where are they located? Figure 4 provides an
initial answer. It colors different counties in this MDL by when they
filed suit (Appendix B provides figures that reproduce this
information in a greyscale version).

81. See infra Section I.G (discussing the challenges and vulnerabilities of potential
and actual litigants); Section II.C (discussing that the JPML considered distance
between the MDL jurisdiction and plaintiffs’ home jurisdictions as it impacted
defendants, not plaintiffs).
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Figure 4. County Governments in MDL #2804 Colored by Filing Window

Notes: Counties shaded dark yellow filed suit before the initial 1407 motion was filed.
Counties shaded light yellow filed suit between when the initial 1407 motion was filed
and when the JPML ordered MDL treatment. Counties in descending shades of green
filed suit afterwards (receiving a new color every passing 6 months). See Appendix B
for a greyscale version of Figure 4.

Figure 4 makes clear that the early filers are not geographically diverse.
The vast majority of early filers are from West Virginia,82 Kentucky,83 and
Southern Ohio.84 Only one county outside of this region, San Joaquin
County in California, was part of the initial 1407 motion. Not
represented on this map are non-county litigants. 85
As the map shows, the early plaintiffs in this MDL clump together in
one part of the country. Geographic proximity is of course not
inherently bad (or good). However, it raises the question of whether
those counties are anomalous in ways relevant for this MDL.

82. One state litigant, ten counties, one city, and five individuals.
83. Twenty-four county litigants.
84. Eleven county litigants, two cities, one individual.
85. Beyond the ones mentioned in the footnotes above, this category is comprised
of two cities from Washington State, one city in Alabama, and the State of Illinois.
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E. Opioid Deaths
The first and perhaps most important variable to consider when
evaluating these counties, and the extent to which they might be
anomalous, is their exposure to the opioid epidemic. A county’s
experience with opioid abuse is likely to shape its thinking about
lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and distributors. I begin with a
county-by-county overview of the average per capita number of opioid
deaths between 1999 and 2016 (Appendix C provides this information
in a greyscale version).
Figure 5. Yearly Per Capita Average of Opioid Deaths Between 1999 and
2016 by County

Notes: Red indicates a higher rate and blue indicates lower rates. Grey indicates missing
or significantly incomplete data. See Appendix C for a greyscale version.

Figure 5 provides a basic sense of where the opioid epidemic has
caused the most harm. The primary lesson for the purposes of this
Article is that opioid deaths are not evenly distributed around the
country. Instead, there are distinct pockets where opioid deaths are
significantly higher than surrounding areas. This raises the question:
how are opioid deaths related to participation in opioid litigation?
There are many ways to tackle this question, but an initial way is to
compare Figure 4 (MDL participation) and Figure 5 (opioid deaths).
Both figures suggest a concentration of activity in West Virginia, nearby
counties in Ohio and Kentucky, as well as isolated counties elsewhere
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in the nation. To hone in further on potential connections, Table 2
compares average opioid death rates across counties by the
participation status of those counties in the federal opioid MDL.
Table 2. Opioid Deaths per 100,000 Residents per Year across Litigation
Categories

Average
1999-2016
2016 only
1999 only

Early in
MDL

In MDL

Not in
MDL

All
Counties

17.06

10.57

8.90

9.33

25.02
10.51

17.32
5.92

15.77
4.60

16.17
4.94

Table 2 again shows that some counties experienced a much higher
average death rate than others (an average death rate of 9.33 for all
counties and almost twice as much for others). Similarly, some
counties were affected by the opioid epidemic much earlier and
therefore much longer than others. The numbers also suggest a ghastly
increase in the opioid death rate over time. 86
To apply these general observations to the litigation at hand, Table
2 shows opioid death rates by broad categories: for those counties in
the MDL that filed opioid-related suits before consolidation, all those
in the MDL (whether they filed early or recently), those counties not
in the MDL at all, and for all counties in the nation (as a baseline
comparison category). This categorization suggests that the actual and
potential county litigants are differently situated. Early MDL filers have
been affected the most by the opioid epidemic and the longest (their
death rates were among the highest as far back as 1999). Other counties
in the MDL have numbers slightly above the national average but lower
than early filers. Counties not in the MDL tend to be less affected.
In one way, this makes intuitive sense: the counties most impacted
by the opioid epidemic do and perhaps should take the lead in
litigating opioid cases. However, there are two problems with this
intuition. First, even counties not at the top of the impact distribution

86. Some see signs that these numbers are starting to plateau. See, e.g., Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivar & Carla K. Johnson, US Health Chief Says Overdose Deaths Beginning to
Level Off, AP NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/2bf839f545ca
4ed98637c1a44ef854ec [https://perma.cc/YB7D-QQE5] (quoting health secretary
Alex Azar as saying that “[w]e are so far from the end of the epidemic, but we are
perhaps, at the end of the beginning”).
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are massively affected by the opioid epidemic. 87 Though less than
some, they are still affected in ways that strain their ability to govern. 88
Similarly, while some of the counties might not have been affected as
early as others, they are still now in the midst of a massive crisis. 89 “Less
affected” in this context is relative indeed and provides little comfort.
Second, while many of the counties most and longest affected by the
opioid epidemic are early filers in the MDL, there are others similarly
situated who are not.
Figures 6.1-6.3 sharpen this point. These figures present monthly moving
averages of per capita deaths from drugs. Each line represents one county
or county-equivalent. I split up the counties once again into three
categories: early participants in MDL 2804 (Figure 6.1), those who filed
later (Figure 6.2), and those who have not yet filed (Figure 6.3).

87. See supra Table 2.
88. See Mike Nolan, More South, Southwest Suburbs Accuse Drug Companies of
Contributing to Opioid Epidemic, CHI. TRIB. (July 31, 2018), https://www.
chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-south-suburbs-opioids-lawsuit-st0801-story.html [https://perma.cc/C5NW-QDLG] (stating that local governments
“have spent significant taxpayer money” on law enforcement and emergency medical
services to combat the opioid crisis).
89. See supra Table 2 (showing that the 2016 rate of opioid-related deaths in
counties not in the MDL was only roughly nine percent less than the rate of opioidrelated deaths of counties in the MDL).
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Figure 6.1. Monthly Moving Average Per Capita Drug Deaths by County
(2003-2017)—Early Filers in MDL #2804
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Figure 6.2. Monthly Moving Average Per Capita Drug Deaths by County
(2003-2017)—Not-Early Filers in MDL #2804
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Figure 6.3. Monthly Moving Average Per Capita Drug Deaths by County
(2003-2017)—Not in MDL #2804

These figures graphically recreate the basic insights of Table 2 (increase
over time, variation between the three groups). However, they are much
messier and much more difficult to read than Table 2 due to the massive
amount of data represented here. The added complexity is justified
because these figures convey, much better than my words could, that yearly
averages between groups, while helpful, hide tremendous variation. Figures
6.1-6.3 show huge variation between counties even in the same group, and
the figures show important variation across time. For example, even within
the few counties that filed early (Figure 6.1), and that on average were
much more affected by the opioid epidemic than most other counties,
Figure 6.1 suggests different experiences. For example, some counties
trend upward in recent years and some downward. Some experienced
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spikes in deaths and others steady developments. Some were affected
earlier than others.
Similarly, a look at Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 shows that while these
categories of counties (late filers and counties that have not filed yet)
are on average less affected than earlier filers, they contain counties
with high and early opioid exposure. Averages and medians can
obscure such variation. In the interest of space and analytical focus,
much of the remainder of this Article will focus on a handful of
summary statistics. Such an approach allows me to focus on a few stark,
overarching points. However, it also entails a loss of important details
and variation (and this Section was dedicated to highlighting the
existence of such variation). As such, I present the following solely as
an initial broad-brushstrokes, descriptive account and leave for future
work more detailed examinations of different facets of the opioid
epidemic and opioid litigation.
F. Demographics
The previous section explored how various actual and potential county
litigants differ with regard to exposure to the opioid epidemic. This
Section does the same for variables that are useful to understand the
opportunities and vulnerabilities of these litigants. It compares, again,
counties across categories (early filers, any filers, non-filers, and the
comparison category of national medians). I begin with broad
demographic variables before turning to education, income, insurance
status, mobility, and poverty.
Table 3. Initial Demographics

Population
Non-White %
Hispanic/Latino %
Non-U.S. Citizen %
Average Household Size
Veteran %

Early in
MDL
63,230
8.06
2.49
1.00
2.52
8.75

In MDL
147,853
17.60
7.67
2.72
2.53
9.23

Not in
MDL
83,819
16.74
12.30
2.85
2.54
9.37

All
Counties
100,027
16.96
11.13
2.81
2.54
9.33

Notes: All terminology and definitions of populations are those used by the U.S. Census
Bureau.

Early and later filers in the MDL are not exceptional in some ways.
The median age across all categories of counties is roughly the same
and so is the average household size and the percentage of the
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population that has served in the military. 90 However, there are also
significant departures. Race, Hispanic/Latino status, and citizenship
stand out as clear, distinguishing elements.91 Counties included in the
MDL that filed early are significantly less diverse and international than
other counties in the nation.92 This is significant because these factors
have historically played a complicated role in accounts concerning drugs,
drug policy, and moral accountability.93 Discussions about drugs, whether
legal or illegal, crack or OxyContin, are rarely only about drugs.94 Instead,
90. Veteran status is notable because of allegations that some opioid
manufacturers specifically targeted veterans. See First Amended Complaint & Jury
Demand, supra note 3 (“Purdue also targeted veterans with its deceptive claims that
they should take opioids.”).
91. I use, with some reservations, the terminology used by the Census Bureau
because this data originates from the ACS administered by the Census Bureau and
there is value in keeping variable names consistent.
92. This claim, like this Article, is focused on the opioid litigation, not the opioid
crisis. As such, I make no claims here about what segment of the population is most
affected or most in need of help. Cf. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov
/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2016/NSDUH-DetTabs-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4U4-RMCK] (providing extensive and detailed information on
the national opioid crisis); see also STEPHANIE SCHMITZ BECHTELER & KATHLEEN KANEWILLIS, CHI. URB. LEAGUE, WHITEWASHED: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN OPIOID EPIDEMIC 2
(2017), https://chiul.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Whitewashed-AA-Opioid-Crisis11-15-17_EMBARGOED_-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AMJ-DKNJ] (stating that
despite the opioid epidemic’s portrayal as an issue affecting white communities,
communities of color have also been “profoundly impacted” by the crisis); Abdullah
Shihipar, The Opioid Crisis Isn’t White, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/opinion/opioid-crisis-drug-users.html (“Labeling
the opioid crisis as ‘white’ risks overlooking the very real damage experienced by black,
Latino and Native American communities.”).
93. See Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-waron-drugs-parents.html (“When the nation’s long-running war against drugs was
defined by the crack epidemic and based in poor, predominantly black urban areas,
the public response was defined by zero tolerance and stiff prison sentences. But
today’s heroin crisis is different. While heroin use has climbed among all demographic
groups, it has skyrocketed among whites; nearly 90 percent of those who tried heroin
for the first time in the last decade were white. And the growing army of families of
those lost to heroin—many of them in the suburbs and small towns—are now using
their influence, anger and grief to cushion the country’s approach to drugs, from
altering the language around addiction to prodding government to treat it not as a
crime, but as a disease.”)
94. See generally Julie Netherland & Helena Hansen, White Opioids: Pharmaceutical
Race and the War on Drugs that Wasn’t, 12 BIOSOCIETIES, 217, 217 (2017) (“[The] less
examined ‘White drug war’ has carved out a less punitive, clinical realm for Whites
where their drug use is decriminalized, treated primarily as a biomedical disease, and
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they are often tied up with narratives about entire categories of people. 95
Even if we conceptualize the opioid epidemic not in criminal terms but
as a public health crisis 96 (perhaps a choice that is itself intertwined
with questions of race),97 it is still difficult to avoid the allure of metaphor
and grand narratives.98 I worry about the wisdom of focusing on race in
discussions about drugs (unless, of course, medically useful). But perhaps
it is inevitable and future researchers might find this data useful to
explain, for example, shifting public sentiments or regulatory
approaches. Table 4 shifts toward related considerations of education.

where their whiteness is preserved, leaving intact more punitive systems that govern
the drug use of people of color.”).
95. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction: Racial
Inequality, Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 443–
44 (2001) (arguing that while the War on Drugs is presented as a program to enforce drug
law nationally, in reality, the program disproportionately targets African and Latino
Americans and enforces racial hierarchies by criminalizing drug use in minority
populations while in White populations, drug use is considered a health problem).
96. See Eric D. Hargan, Acting Secretary, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Determination That a Public Health Emergency Exists (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opioid%20PHE%20Declaration-no-sig.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UN3K-7J7K] (stating that “a public health emergency exists
nationwide”).
97. See Vann R. Newkirk II, What the ‘Crack Baby’ Panic Reveals About The Opioid
Epidemic, ATLANTIC (July 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/07/what-the-crack-baby-panic-reveals-about-the-opioid-epidemic/533763
[https://perma.cc/DX8T-35EW] (“Today’s opioid epidemic presents a mostly-white face
to the world, and the larger ‘epidemic of despair’ tends to target communities in vaunted
‘Middle America,’ as opposed to inner-city Baltimore and Detroit. And with that changing
face comes better results. Instead of wide-scale carceral panics and schemes to imprison
addicted mothers, the country has considered a public-health approach . . . .”).
98. See generally SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 5 (1989) (“Saying a thing
is or is like something-it-is-not is a mental operation as old as philosophy and poetry.”);
SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 3–4 (1978) (“My point is that illness is not a
metaphor, and that the most truthful way of regarding illness—and the healthiest way
of being ill—is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking. Yet it is
hardly possible to take up one’s residence in the kingdom of the ill unprejudiced by
the lurid metaphors with which it has been landscaped.”). See also Roger M. Michalski,
A Primer on Opioid-Epidemic Litigation, JOTWELL (Mar. 7, 2019), https://courtslaw.
jotwell.com/a-primer-on-opioid-epidemic-litigation [https://perma.cc/4HYL-HR9L].
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Table 4. Education

High School or Higher
%
Bachelor or Higher %

Early in
MDL

In MDL

Not in
MDL

All
Counties

74.59

79.95

80.11

80.07

16.09

20.55

20.87

20.79

Notes: All terminology and definitions of populations are those used by the U.S. Census
Bureau.

Again, breaking apart the variables of interest by categories shows that
counties that are early MDL filers tend to have populations that are less
educated than their peers. These counties have a lower percentage of
high school graduates and individuals who completed an undergraduate
degree. This might be relevant because populations that received more
or less formal education might systematically vary in terms of how they
react to medical claims; their susceptibility to marketing strategies, their
ability to obtain multiple medical opinions and evaluate them; how much
sympathy they receive from doctors; and ultimately, their ability to use
opioids without overdosing.99 Also, insofar as a potential resolution to the
opioid epidemic contains a public awareness campaign, as the tobacco
settlement did,100 then it should be mindful that populations with different
education levels might be exposed and respond to such a campaign
differently. Also, formal education is linked to income levels. Table 5 explores
questions of income and employment.
Table 5. Income and Employment

Median Household
Income
Median Individual
Earnings
Female/Male Earnings
Ratio
No Work at some Point
in Time in the last Year

Early in
MDL

In
MDL

Not in
MDL

All
Counties

41,972

46,503

47,506

47,252

27,272

27,769

27,925

27,886

0.6728

0.6793

0.6788

0.6789

34.70

28.39

26.90

27.28

99. I make no claims here about the direction of the causality. An educated
population might be more or less vulnerable.
100. Nicholas Terry & Alia Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the
Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFFS. (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full [https://perma.cc/3PVC-M94J].
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Notes: Household income and individual earnings are reported as medians by county.
Because both distributions are heavily skewed, these numbers are significantly lower
than national averages.

Table 5 shows that early filer counties have a significantly lower
median household income than all other categories of counties. This
suggests that people in these counties are generally poorer than their
peers and that these counties have a smaller tax base from which to
fund opioid related expenses. Later filing counties are poorer than
counties not in the MDL, but the difference is far less stark.
Individual earnings are more comparable between all categories of
counties. This suggests that counties included in the MDL that filed early
and later have lower labor participation rates than their non-MDL litigating
peers. Relatedly, while individual earnings are comparable, labor stability is
not. Individuals in early filer counties reported at much higher rates that,
at some point in the previous year, they had no work. This suggests a more
transient labor force that lacks stable and consistent work.101
Employment is frequently not only a source of income, but also
health care benefits. Table 6 explores health care coverage.
Table 6. Health Insurance Status

% with any insurance
% with private insurance
% with public insurance

Early in
MDL
89.52
59.01
43.71

In MDL
88.28
63.93
38.26

Not in
MDL
87.76
64.02
37.66

All
Counties
87.89
63.99
37.81

Notes: All terminology and definitions of populations are those used by the U.S. Census
Bureau.

Table 6 shows that early filing counties have a higher percentage of
individuals living within them that have health insurance than their peers.
This alleviates to some extent fears that a population suffering from the
opioid crisis might do so without insurance coverage. However, it is
important to recognize that early filing counties have a lower rate of
private insurance coverage than other counties and a higher percentage
of individuals with public coverage. 102 This highlights the burden that
the opioid crisis has imposed on public sector insurance programs in
101. Table 4 also shows individual earning ratios between male and female workers.
The ratios are abysmal, but uniformly abysmal across these categories.
102. “Public insurance coverage” includes: medicare, medicaid, tricare or other
military health care, VA health care, and Indian health service care.
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general103 and particularly in the counties that decided to file suit early. It also
suggests that government units might have a greater or different insurancecoverage based interest in resolving the opioid crisis. Conceivably, the effects
of the opioid crisis might be most apparent in the jail bookings of one county
and the health insurance payments of its neighbor.
This example also reminds us about the possibility of people moving
around. Opioid use is not inherently static. Somebody might start taking
legally prescribed opioids in one county, become dependent in another
county, switch to illegally obtained opioids in a third, cause expenses in a
fourth, and die in a fifth. All of these five counties are affected by the
opioid crisis but in different ways. As such, this Article inquires into the
extent to which people are mobile and move around.
Table 7. Mobility

Internal move within
state
Move from different
state
Born in state of
residence

Early in
MDL

In MDL

Not in
MDL

All
Counties

3.65

4.08

4.31

4.25

1.80

1.99

2.27

2.20

76.15

69.15

64.63

65.78

Notes: Internal moves within a state include only moves from one county to another
within the last year. Moves from different state are within the last year.

Table 7 uses three proxies for overall mobility. The first proxy is the
percentage of people who moved from one county to another within the
same state in the last year. The second proxy measures how many people
in a county have moved there from another state within the past year. The
third proxy counts the percentage of residents who were born in the
same state where they now reside. On all three measures, early filers
and all counties in the MDL exhibit less mobility than other counties.
Insofar as people affected by the opioid crisis do not move around, they
remain the responsibility of the same county. This reduces, but does not
eliminate, one aspect of the complex causation issue inherent in
governments suing in relation to a public health crisis that affects their past,
103. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS,
FINAL REPORT 31 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
images/Final_Report_Draft_11-1-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD72-Y2SF] (“Approximately
25% of the economic burden was borne by public sector (Medicaid, Medicare, and
veterans’ programs) and other government sources for substance abuse treatment.”).
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current, and future residents. Table 8 turns to some of the most vulnerable
residents in these counties.
Table 8. Vulnerability and Assistance

Poverty %
Disability %
Food Stamps %
Public Assistance %
Vulnerability Index

Early in
MDL
21.15
20.41
20.43
28.21
0.1378

In MDL
17.51
16.20
15.62
25.44
-0.0093

NOT in
MDL
17.09
15.87
14.53
26.31
0.0031

All
Counties
17.20
15.95
14.81
26.10
0

Notes: The Vulnerability Index is normalized to the national mean.

Table 8 demonstrates the extent to which early filers and counties in the
MDL that filed later have higher percentages of vulnerable populations
than their peers. They have more residents who are experiencing poverty,
more people with disabilities, and more vulnerable individuals (those
particularly young or old). This is true for all counties in the MDL and even
more so for the ones that filed first. Not surprisingly, these counties tend to
have populations with more need for assistance such as food stamps.
Given the extent of the opioid crisis, it is difficult to know whether the
opioid crisis is the cause or effect here. I suspect, without knowing, that the
opioid crisis did not create these effects but likely exaggerated them,
perhaps, as some allege, because opioid manufacturers specifically targeted
vulnerable populations.104 Suffice it to say here that the counties in the
MDL, and the earlier filers in particular, have significant percentages of
people in need of assistance. They are among the worst situated to deal with
a massive public health crisis.
G. A Story in Numbers
These numbers, tables, and figures tell a story. They present a broadbrushstrokes portrait of the potential plaintiffs that chose to participate in
this MDL and those that did not. This portrait allows us to better
understand, in the aggregate, the challenges and vulnerabilities of different
actual and potential litigants. As we will see in the next section, MDL
doctrine does not take into account many of these elements.

104. See First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 3 (alleging that
Purdue targeted elderly patients by asking doctors to commit to giving elderly people
opioids and coaching sales representatives to focus on geriatric patients).
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II. NORMATIVE CONCERNS
MDL litigation faces many critics, 105 but the descriptive account of
the previous section highlights a problem that has largely escaped
scholarly attention: the MDL statute focuses on cases that present
“common questions of fact” and where transfer serves the vague goals
of furthering “the convenience of parties and witnesses” and
“promot[ing] the just and efficient conduct” of transferred cases. 106
The JPML is charged with interpreting these terms and ordering or
denying the transfer of cases 107 with little supervision. 108 The JPML has
power over all cases in federal courts, and its decisions to transfer are
not limited by personal jurisdiction considerations. 109 It weights the
centrality and heft of common issues of fact, the potential for litigation
efficiency gains (e.g., through minimizing duplicative discovery), how
far advanced different cases are, and perhaps party preferences. 110
When weighing the creation of a new MDL and transferring new
potential member cases, the JPML seems most concerned with the
benefits of consistent and uniform pretrial rulings. 111
105. See, e.g., Redish & Karaba, supra note 13, at 111 (stating that an MDL
proceeding is “something of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century political
smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies”); see also Mullenix, supra note 13, at 552.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
107. See generally Hon. John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution,
82 TUL. L. REV. 2225 (2008) (tracing the development of the JPML and providing an
overview of its practices).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2012) (stating that orders to transfer may not be
reviewed except by “extraordinary writ”; orders not to transfer may not be reviewed);
see also Paul M. Janicke, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Now a Strengthened
Traffic Cop for Patent Venue, 32 REV. LITIG. 497, 512 (2013) (failing to find any successful
writs of mandamus since the JPML’s creation in 1968); Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for
Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1643, 1643 (2011) (arguing for the expansion of non-discretionary interlocutory
appeals to combat the “outsized impact” of unreviewable pretrial rulings).
109. See Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 1463, 1463 (2019) (noting that lower courts operate as if personal jurisdiction
concerns do not apply in this context); Bradt, supra note 9, at 1165–66 (“Surprisingly,
despite the fact that the MDL court is where all of the action in these cases typically
happens, that court need not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs or the
defendants under the rules that would apply were the cases being litigated one-by-one.”).
110. Party preferences might matter more in deciding where to centralize than
whether to centralize. See generally Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party
Preferences in Multidistrict Litigation, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283968
[https://perma.cc/X9L6RYPY?type=image] (presenting empirical data on the relationship between party
preferences and the assignment of MDLs to particular districts).
111. See Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245,
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In the context of the opioid MDL, the benefits of consolidated pretrial treatment are massive. For example, discovery under a single
judge will be more consistent, focused, and efficient than discovery
rulings by many judges around the country deciding identical or
similar issues over and over. 112 However, while the benefits might be
massive, so are the overlooked costs: the MDL statute does not test for
broader social and governmental interest that might not be served in
a given set of cases by MDL treatment.
This Section turns to these doctrinal and normative concerns that
the descriptive account above indicated. It is a free-standing account
that is not dependent on the descriptive account but is bolstered by it.
A. Heterogeneity and First Mover Idiosyncrasies
All aggregate litigation struggles with balancing efficiency and
norms that prize autonomous party adversarialism. 113 MDL transfers
might, at first sight, present few tradeoffs because 1407 only allows
transfers for “pretrial proceedings” and, in contrast to class actions,
includes no device to force settlements onto unwilling litigants. 114
However, this should not blind us to the important costs imposed on
individual litigants, especially those not selected as lead counsel or
included in any steering committees. 115 For example, they must ask the
court for permission to file any motions, and they are often prevented
from making motions that would be routine in non-MDL litigation. 116
Plaintiffs excluded from MDL leadership roles have few tools available
to influence the course of litigation. 117 For example, imagine that one
2270–72 (2008) (arguing that the JPML attempts a “maximalist” use of its transfer
power to avoid conflicting pretrial rulings).
112. See Bradt & Clopton, supra note 26, at 920 (“A single judge overseeing
consolidated cases is in a better position to police duplicative discovery requests than
scores of judges hearing hundreds of separate cases. A single judge also could resolve
each of the many inevitable discovery disputes only once—a major savings for court
and lawyer resources. On the expert side, Daubert motions, which are often very
expensive and central to the resolution of mass tort cases, can be centralized too.”).
113. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in
an Age of Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2015).
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
115. See Silver & Miller, supra note 62, at 146 (“[F]orced aggregation may saddle claimants
with agency costs by putting them at the mercy of lawyers they cannot control or discharge.”).
116. Case Management Order One at 11, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 232 (“No party may file any motion
not expressly authorized by this Order absent further Order of this Court . . . .”).
117. Order Re: Motions for Leave to File Motions in Track One Cases, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2019), ECF No.
1278 (“[W]ith respect to the Track One Cases only, the Court hereby lifts its
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of the plaintiffs in the MDL does not agree with the lead counsel’s
approach to, say, discovery strategy. 118 All they realistically can do is
wait, often for years, before their case becomes eligible for a transfer
back to the district where they first filed their suit and before it was
transferred to the MDL. Once back home, they are still largely stuck
with the pretrial rulings that they had little chance to influence. 119 Most
of the plaintiffs in the MDL have effectively no control over lead
counsel and the steering committees, yet the decisions of these other
attorneys have, in practice, massive consequences over how well any
one case is prepared for trial and whether a party can credibly seek a
high or low settlement value. 120
Who is selected into MDL leadership roles is, in short, very
important. It matters tremendously to those attorneys who receive
more money, more recognition, more experience, and a higher
chance to be selected as lead counsel in the next MDL proceeding. 121
But even more significant, selection of MDL leadership also matters to
the clients of those attorneys. An MDL is not a class action proceeding
and does not feature the same structural due process protections.122 MDL
lead counsel does not become counsel for all member cases in the MDL.
Each plaintiff in each member case (including the case that furnished
lead counsel and other MDL leadership roles) retains the power to hire,
requirement to seek leave to file substantive motions pertaining to issues in the Track
One Cases. Parties may hereby file these motions directly on the docket.”).
118. See, e.g., Twenty-Three Sovereign Indian Tribes’ Motion for Leave to File
Motion to Be Allowed to Conduct Discovery on Certain Issues That Are Unique to the
Claims of Indian Tribes at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2018), ECF No. 1164 [hereinafter Indian Tribes’ Motion for Leave]
(requesting permission to conduct discovery separately from the Bellwether plaintiffs
because defendants raised issues that are unique to the Indian Tribe Movants).
119. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed. 2004)
(“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made by the
transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, doing so in the
absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate the purposes of
centralized pretrial proceedings.”); Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in
Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595,
605 (1987) (praising law of the case doctrine for precluding inconsistent decisions).
120. See generally Silver & Miller, supra note 62, at 131–35 (describing how lead attorneys
can increase their own compensation by controlling the settlement negotiations).
121. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in
Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1488 (2017)
(analyzing social networks to determine that transferee judges routinely appoint the
same lead attorneys).
122. See Tidmarsh & Peinado Welsh, supra note 10, at 17–20 (“Although
multidistrict litigation has inched towards the class-action model, analogous
protections have not followed.”).
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direct, and fire his or her own attorney.123 The ethical duties of those
attorneys also run to their clients, not the clients of other attorneys in the
MDL.124 Key MDL leadership roles are few in number,125 powerful, and
linked to the clients of the attorneys in the leadership roles.126
The overbearing influence of lead counsel in MDL cases is a concern
in any MDL proceeding. 127 It is of heightened concern in the context
of the opioid litigation because the plaintiffs here are unusually
heterogeneous along many dimensions. First, the plaintiffs encompass
many different types of litigants, including government litigants, nonprofits, businesses, and individuals. 128 Second, even within each of
these categories there is important variation. For example, there are
individuals in the litigation who are suing on their own behalf, who are
suing on behalf of somebody already dead, and who are suing on
behalf of their children who were exposed to opioids before birth. 129
Similarly, within the category of government litigants there are states,
counties, municipalities and sub-municipalities. Even if we just focus on
the largest category of plaintiffs (counties), there is massive variation in
location, population, wealth, litigation resources and experience,
governing powers and responsibilities, and varying exposure to the opioid
epidemic (early/late, low/high, legally prescribed/illegally obtained). 130
This extreme variation sets the opioid epidemic plaintiffs apart from those
in many other MDL cases where similarly situated individual consumers
allege more comparable harm.

123. See, e.g., Bradt, supra note 9, at 1206 (“Individual plaintiffs file their own cases
and hire their own lawyers [in MDL proceedings].”).
124. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 525;
Stephen J. Herman, Duties Owed by Appointed Counsel to MDL Litigants Whom They Do Not
Formally Represent, 64 LOY. L. REV. 1, 1–24 (2018).
125. See Transcript of Teleconference Proceedings Had before the Honorable
Judge Dan A. Polster, Judge of Said Court, on Wednesday, December 13th, 2017,
Commencing at 1:00 O’Clock P.M. at 13, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2017), ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Teleconference Transcript]
(“I will want a very small number from the plaintiffs’ side. You know, we are not talking like
probably no more than two or three from the plaintiffs’ side . . . .”).
126. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2015) (noting the absence of competitive checks by lawyers on
the steering committee).
127. See Marcus, supra note 111, at 2256 (“Yet another fairness consideration is the
degree of personal control that a litigant loses when her claim is combined with the
claims of others.”).
128. See supra Section I.B.
129. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
130. See supra Part I.
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Not only are the potential and actual plaintiffs here extremely
heterogeneous, but the early filers are also idiosyncratic. They differ in
important and systematic ways from later filers (now in the MDL) and
non-filers. Early filers have a profile that suggests a stance toward the
opioid epidemic that is different in multifaceted ways from the stance of
later filers. Yet, only the early filers were present when the MDL
consolidation motion was first argued, when people were nominated for
key leadership positions, 131 and when they were filled. 132 At that point in
time, the court was only able to select attorneys for leadership roles from
among the fifty or so cases that were in front of the court. 133 The
plaintiffs in the 1900 cases that were filed later are represented by their
own attorneys, but these attorneys have little influence over the litigation
and were never considered for leadership roles. 134
The attorneys in those leadership roles represent clients who are unlike
many of the plaintiffs that are now in the MDL. As the previous section
showed, there is reason to believe that litigation interests of these
differently situated plaintiffs might diverge in relevant ways. When they
do, will lead counsel pick the course of action in the best interest of her
individual client?135 Or what is in the best interest of the “average case”
currently in the MDL? Or what might further the interests of potential
plaintiffs that will likely join the MDL some day? If lead counsel is
primarily concerned with her own client, then that attorney might pick a
litigation strategy best suited for the individual circumstances of her own

131. See Teleconference Transcript, supra note 125, at 6, (“[U]ltimately, it is [the Court’s]
appointment, but I will certainly rely heavily on suggestions from the parties . . . .”).
132. See Minutes of Teleconference & Scheduling Order at 1–2, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2017), ECF
No. 4 (“Counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants shall file a Motion to Approve Liaison
Counsel and Steering Committees.”).
133. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Approve Co-Leads, Co-Liaisons, and Plaintiffs’
Executive Committee at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2017), ECF No. 16.
134. The MDL leadership does not have to be static. The court retains the power to
appoint new attorneys to leadership roles. However, MDL judges rarely do so. Sometimes
they tweak leadership roles, but they rarely reform. See, e.g., Order at 1, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2017), ECF No. 22
(noting that the leadership team should be restructured to include at least one attorney
handling Third-Party Payor cases and one attorney handling Hospital cases).
135. See generally Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The
Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2013) (suggesting a conflict of interest exists in acquiring
attorneys’ fees that cannot be adequately regulated through the trial courts’ inherent
authority to enforce ethics rules).
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client. Other cases in the MDL might be shortchanged. 136 The other
plaintiffs in the other MDL cases might face very different individual
circumstances, and their attorney would have chosen a course of action
more attuned to the needs, interests, and vulnerabilities of her client.
Not surprisingly, numerous plaintiffs in the MDL have stressed that they
do not feel properly represented and that the individual circumstances
between the various plaintiffs vary too much. 137 They argue that no
leadership structure could hold together such diverse members.138
The court has responded to concerns about heterogeneity in the litigation
in part by creating different “tracks” for different cases. For example, Case
Management Order No. 1 selected a handful of plaintiffs (out of more than
2000) for the litigation track.139 These cases are being prepared for trial while
all others do not receive the same attention. Later court orders established

136. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2012) (noting important agency-cost considerations in
MDL cases). But cf. Mark Robinson Jr. & Kevin Calcagnie, To Join an MDL . . . or Not,
37 TRIAL 34, 41–42 (2001) (noting that plaintiffs may benefit from MDLs because their
case will be controlled by more experienced plaintiff’s counsel); Tidmarsh & Peinado
Welsh, supra note 10, at 21 (“In addition, even though MDL plaintiffs formally file
individual lawsuits, rather than opt into a class action, many lawyers who file their clients’
cases in federal court are aware of, and may even be angling for, multidistrict treatment.”).
137. See, e.g., Motion for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for
Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings at 1, In re Infants Born OpioidDependent Prods. Liab. Litig. at 1, MDL 2872 (J.P.M.L. Sept. 20, 2018) (arguing for
transfer to a separate MDL because “[m]ovants have grave concerns that the due
process rights of opioid-dependent infants are not being protected in MDL 2804”).
138. Brief Amici Curiae of 448 Federally Recognized Tribes in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Tribal Claims at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2018), ECF No. 1026 (arguing it is
imperative that the Tribes get a “seat at the table” because the states are the Tribes’
“deadliest enemies”). See generally Melissa Mortazavi, Institutional Independence: Lawyers
and the Administrative State, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2019) (emphasizing the
importance of the institutional setting of a lawyer in shaping legal judgments).
139. Case Management Order One, supra note 116, at 6 (“The following three cases
are included in Track One . . . .”); see also Case Management Order Number Six, supra
note 78, at 1–2 (setting briefing deadlines for two Indian Tribe case); Case
Management Order Number Four at 1–3, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No.
1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2018), ECF No. 485 (setting briefing
deadlines for Track One cases, a third-party payor case, and a hospital case, identifying
“six cases brought by local governmental entities for briefing of motions to dismiss”).
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additional tracks (e.g., one for a handful of tribal cases)140 and refused to
establish other tracks (e.g., for the so-called opioid baby claims).141
While different tracks help to alleviate the problems of heterogeneity and
idiosyncrasies, they cannot plaster over the important differences between
different litigants in any given track. For example, in the track for Native
American Tribes, the court selected a few tribes as lead plaintiffs who can
now litigate in ways that the remaining tribal track plaintiffs cannot.142 The
creation of this track recognizes the important differences between tribal
governments and non-tribal governments. However, tribes vary
tremendously in ways that are relevant for this litigation. They vary in
population, wealth, governing capacity, litigation resources, geography,
geographical concentration, reliance on federal health care measures, and
many more variables.143 This variation makes the tribal track a poor substitute
for local and individualized litigation that would be more mindful of
individualized circumstances. Similarly, tribes that were not included by the
time the lead cases for the tribal track were selected did not even have a
chance to be selected. These plaintiffs, just like the majority of those currently
in the MDL, are stuck watching another government’s attorney litigate, also
not on their behalf.144

140. Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D.
Ohio June 4, 2018), ECF No. 549 (“[The] work [of one of the special masters] will be
focused on resolving a protocol for the coordination of depositions between the
related state and federal cases, and working with the Tribes to develop a Case
Management Order and a separate MDL track.”).
141. Motion for Leave to File Motion for Order to Establish Separate Track for
Opioid Baby Claims at 1–2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP
(N.D. Ohio May 31, 2018), ECF No. 540; Order [Non-Document] Denying Motion for Leave
to File Motion for Order to Establish Separate Track for Opioid Baby Claims, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio June 28, 2018).
142. Plaintiffs’ Ponca Tribe of Nebraska, et al., Motion for Order(s) Establishing a
Separate Tribal Government Tract at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 28, 2018), ECF No. 502 (requesting that “lead,
coordinating, committee, and trial counsel” be selected).
143. See generally C. Matthew Snipp, Sociological Perspectives on American Indians, 18
ANN. REV. SOC. 351 (1992) (discussing differences between tribes).
144. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) (noting the procedural justice concerns inherent in
non-class aggregation).

2019]

MDL IMMUNITY

219

B. Black Holes
Beyond control, there is the question of time-to-resolution. Speed is
always a concern in litigation. 145 How long cases in the opioid MDL
take to resolve is of particular concern because of the opioid epidemic’s
horrendous scale. If some or all of the plaintiffs are indeed entitled to
relief under the law (monetary or injunctive), then it is vital that they
receive such relief as quickly as possible. Early relief would put them in a
stronger position to battle the opioid litigation, either through injunctions
that slow the flow of medically unnecessary opioids or through monetary
relief that could be used to fund important government functions
connected to the opioid epidemic. If the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief
under the law, then this would be important to know sooner rather than
later as well, so that these government units can focus their attention and
resources to pursue other avenues to battle the opioid epidemic (e.g.,
taxation of opioids or further federal and/or local regulations).
How long the litigants in the opioid MDL have to wait until these
cases resolve is anybody’s guess. MDL cases typically remain in
coordinated or consolidated proceedings until pretrial matters are
concluded, the case settles, or the MDL court grants a dispositive
motion that terminates the cases. 146 It is difficult to predict how long
this will take in the opioid case. Generally, MDL litigation takes a
significant time to reach resolution, much longer than the average
non-MDL litigation. 147 This type of litigation has been described,
famously, as the “‘black hole,’ into which cases are transferred never to be
heard from again.”148 For some MDL judges, remand equates to failure. 149
145. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These Rules] should be construed, administered,
and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” (emphasis added)).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by
the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from
which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”).
147. See, e.g., DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.
Mass. 2006) (“[A]s compared to the processing time of an average case, MDL practice
is slow, very slow.”); Hon. John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and
Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIG. 26, 31 (2012) (“The single most prominent
complaint about multidistrict litigation arises from counsel’s negative experiences in
so-called black hole cases—those that seem not to move at an acceptable pace.”).
148. Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2323, 2330 (2008).
149. See Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 144 (2013) (“As
a matter of judicial culture, remanding cases is viewed as an acknowledgment that the
MDL judge has failed to resolve the case, by adjudication or settlement, during the
MDL process. That view, together with the business model of aggregation and
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In the case of the opioid litigation, we can gather more clues about
the speed of litigation through a look at the litigation track that the
court established. Only cases that were filed in the district where the
MDL takes place, 150 or where the parties waived jurisdictional defenses,
are eligible for trial in that locale. 151 The few cases in this track are the
only ones that are currently prepared for trial. The hope is that they
will serve as bellwether trials that can inform settlement
negotiations. 152 As such, the court and many commentators do not
expect significant developments in non-litigation track cases until, at
the very least, the trials of these cases have completed. 153
Originally, the MDL court hoped for trials in these cases to begin in
March 2019. 154 Commentators were impressed by the suggested speed
of litigation. 155 However, the original trial date has been pushed back
a few times, first to September, 156 then October, 157 and it might be
consolidation of cases for settlement, interfered with the litigation of individual cases
in the MDL court.”).
150. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 43 (1998)
(holding that a transferee court does not have the authority to self-assign by ruling on
a transfer motion).
151. Parties that filed elsewhere can waive jurisdictional objections and allow for trial in
the transferee court if they file a so-called “Lexecon waiver” that is clear and unambiguous. See,
e.g., In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2017).
152. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 37 REV. LITIG. 185
(2018) (describing the use of bellwether trials in MDL and the issues raised by the
practice); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008)
(advocating for bellwether trials as means of combining autonomy and efficiency);
Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (2017)
(comparing bellwether mediation to bellwether trials).
153. Teleconference Transcript, supra note 125, at 15 (“My thought is to just leave
[cases with remand potential] hanging for a while. The cases are in the MDL, and my
objective is to get my hands around this and see if there is some—maybe some
framework for some resolution, and if so, it is much preferable to have more cases in
the MDL, the more the better, rather than having them out there in individual state
courts where there can’t be any coordination.”).
154. Case Management Order One, supra note 116, at 8 (“The Court intends to
begin the trial at 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time on Monday, March 18, 2019 . . . .”).
155. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstead, Polster Sets Aggressive Discovery Schedule, Slating
Opioid Trial for March 2019, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 12, 2018, 6:10 PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/04/12/polster-sets-aggressivediscovery-schedule-as-first-opioid-trial-is-slated-for-march-2019 (calling the case
management order and the early trial date “aggressive”).
156. Case Management Order No. 7 Setting New Deadlines for Track One Cases,
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13,
2018), ECF No. 876 (entering amended case management schedule and setting a first
trial start date for track one cases for September 3, 2019).
157. Case Management Order No. 8 Setting New Deadlines for Track One Cases,
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29,
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pushed back further still. 158 Half of the original bellwether cases have
been postponed indefinitely until trial in other cases has completed. 159
Even with the remaining few cases concluded, there is no reason to
anticipate a global solution shortly thereafter. Diverse plaintiffs with
individualized discovery needs are unlikely to benefit from the
bellwether trials of plaintiffs that are differently situated and few in
number. 160 Whether these first plaintiffs win or lose would tell other
plaintiffs little about the strengths or weaknesses of their own cases.
Before taking their own cases to trial or settling, many might desire
individualized discovery that has not yet taken place and that could
take many more months to complete after the first round of trials.
The litigation in the opioid MDL so far has been focused on the cases
that are being prepared for trial. There has been little attention focused on
the non-litigation track cases. For example, twenty-three sovereign Indian
tribes moved “to be Allowed to Conduct Discovery on Certain Issues that
are Unique to the Claims of Indian Tribes”161 The court denied the motion
the next day as “untimely and a waste of judicial resources” because some
cases of other tribes were selected for the litigation track to serve as
bellwether cases.162 This means that the non-selected cases linger in limbo
without further discovery taking place. The discovery in the selected cases
might be useful for non-selected cases but, at least in this instance,
numerous plaintiffs seem to have preferred their own individualized
2019), ECF No. 1306 (entering amended case management schedule and setting a first
trial start date for Track One cases for October 21, 2019).
158. See, e.g., The State’s Emergency Motion to Show Cause for Purdue’s Intentional
Disregard of Two Court Orders and Failure to Provide Witness as Ordered by the
Court at 2, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018) [hereinafter State’s Emergency Motion] (“The MDL
settlement process is stuck in glue and the first trial in the MDL has been moved back
to at least September 2019 . . . and it will be moved back again.”). But cf. Nunc Pro Tunc
Order Re Expert Depositions at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2019), ECF No. 1540 (“The Court has, on more than
one occasion, moved the dates for the Track One trial back at the behest of the parties
and declines to do so now or at any point in the future.”).
159. Order Regarding Track One Trial Plaintiffs at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2019), ECF No. 1392 (“The claims of the City of
Cleveland and the City of Akron (the ‘Municipal Plaintiffs’) will be set for trial at a later date,
which shall not occur before the trial of the claims of the Track Two Bellwethers . . . .”).
160. See, Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary
Perspective on Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 964 (2012) (“The problem with
extreme value averaging is that it is highly nonrobust, meaning it is badly sensitive to
outliers and performs terribly on asymmetric distributions.”).
161. Indian Tribes’ Motion for Leave, supra note 118, at 1.
162. Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 4, 2018), ECF No. 1165.
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discovery.163 For now, MDL treatment of the opioid cases has mostly bought
the defendants time164 without providing significant efficiency gains thus
far.165 Some litigants fear that defendants will use this time to move assets
abroad,166 file for bankruptcy,167 and otherwise make it difficult for plaintiffs
to execute a potential judgment down the road.168
Contrast the delay in waiting for the result of bellwether cases with
some of the opioid cases that remained in state courts and thus beyond
the power of the JPML to order transfer to the federal MDL. 169 For
example, one opioid case was filed in Oklahoma state court and
163. Indian Tribes’ Motion for Leave, supra note 118, at 3 (“It is imperative that the
Indian Tribe Movants be allowed to conduct the discovery unique to Tribes in order to
protect their sovereign rights and authority, as well as to properly evaluate their claims.”).
164. See Mark Herrmann, To MDL or not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, 24 LITIG. 43,
44 (1998) (noting that MDL proceedings can buy defendants time to “organize a
defense, negotiate a global settlement, or file a bankruptcy proceeding”).
165. See Benjamin W. Larson, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach: Respecting the Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1337, 1364
(1999) (“[M]any of [the] arguments concerning the efficiency gains of consolidated
trial are not supported by reality.”).
166. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 110, New York v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. 4000016/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2019) (highlighting that despite the fact
that the Sackler defendants knew that the state attorneys general were investigating
and commencing actions against Purdue by 2014, they still continued voting to have
Purdue pay them significant distributions as well as wire money to offshore
companies); see also Roni Caryn Rabin, New York Sues Sackler Family Members and Drug
Distributors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/
health/new-york-lawsuit-opioids-sacklers-distributors.html (“As investigators closed in
on Purdue Pharma, the maker of the opioid painkiller OxyContin, more than a decade
ago, members of the family that owns the company began shifting hundreds of millions
of dollars from the business to themselves through offshore entities . . . . ”).
167. See Sara Randazzo & Jared S. Hopkins, Opioid Maker Explores Filing for Chapter
11, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/purdue-pharmapreparing-for-possible-bankruptcy-filing-11551721519 (outlining Purdue Pharma’s
preparation of a bankruptcy filing in response to opioid-related lawsuits); Mike
Spector et al., Exclusive: OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Exploring Bankruptcy—Sources,
REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ukpurduepharma-bankruptcy-exclusive/exclusive-oxycontin-maker-purdue-pharmaexploring-bankruptcy-sources-idUSKCN1QL1KP
[https://perma.cc/NFL6-KQC7]
(reporting first that Purdue Pharma was considering declaring bankruptcy as a
response to the opioid-related lawsuits it faced).
168. See State’s Emergency Motion, supra note 158, at 2–3 (“Purdue is trying to buy time
so it can move assets and employees overseas . . . and either file bankruptcy or leave an
empty shell here in the United States for all of the victims of its corporate greed.”).
169. The JPML cannot transfer non-federal cases. However, MDL judges often
informally coordinate with state court proceedings. See generally EMERY G. LEE III, FED. J.
CTR., SURVEY OF TRANSFEREE JUDGES IN MDL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING COORDINATION WITH
PARALLEL STATE PROCEEDINGS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION 1–2 (2011).
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became non-removable, seemingly because of a mistake by counsel for
the defendants. 170 The case has remained in state court despite
subsequent efforts to remove to federal court and invoke 1407. The
Oklahoma case was filed around the same time as hundreds of others
now in the federal opioid MDL. While most of the federal cases appear
years away from deep and individualized discovery and an on-themerits adjudication, the case in Oklahoma state court went to trial in
May 2019, and judgment was granted in August. 171 Attempts by the
defendants to delay trial largely failed. 172 While the federal MDL slowly
proceeds in Cleveland (the city), the most advanced state opioid case
already ended in Cleveland County (Oklahoma).
The local trial in Oklahoma is not the only lawsuit that remained
outside of the federal MDL. Other examples include Alabama, 173
Alaska, 174 Arizona, 175 Delaware, 176 Florida, 177 Indiana, 178 Kentucky, 179

170. Defendants stipulated to non-removability in exchange for more time to
answer the complaint, and they requested removal after the time allowed in 28 USC
§ 1446(b). See Stipulation, supra note 29, at 2.
171. Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/ health/oklahomaopioids-johnson-and-johnson.html.
172. See, e.g., Nate Raymond, OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Loses Bid to Delay Opioid
Epidemic Trial, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-opioids-litigation/oxycontin-maker-purdue-pharma-loses-bid-to-delay-opioidepidemic-trial-idUSKBN1QQ00B [https://perma.cc/8324-5TX2] (reporting Purdue
Pharma and other drug makers lost their bid to delay trial because they had not
established that plaintiff’s actions had prejudiced them).
173. Alabama v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2:18-cv-00089-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. filed
Feb. 6, 2018).
174. State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3AN-17-09966CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Oct.
30, 2017).
175. State ex rel. Brnovich v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. CV2017-012008 (Ariz.
Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2017).
176. Delaware ex rel. Denn v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:18-cv-00383-RGA (D. Del.
filed Mar. 9, 2018) (filed originally in Delaware Superior Court on January 19, 2018
and removed to federal court in March).
177. Amended Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2018-CA-001438 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 16, 2018).
178. Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (Ind. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018).
179. Complaint, Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Endo Health Sols. Inc., No. 17CI-1147 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2017).
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Louisiana, 180 Massachusetts, 181 Mississippi, 182 Missouri, 183 Montana, 184
New Hampshire, 185 New Jersey, 186 New Mexico, 187 New York, 188 North
Carolina, 189 Ohio, 190 South Carolina, 191 and Washington. 192 Many of
them are moving far quicker toward resolution than their MDL
litigation track counterparts, and all of them are moving faster than
the MDL cases not on the litigation track.
C. Distance
Beyond concerns about speed, there are also concerns about
distance. Most of the plaintiffs in this MDL filed in their home districts,
a place as close as possible to where they are located. Inherent in the MDL
process is a transfer away from such home districts to any one of the federal
districts in the country (in the opioid litigation, the Northern District of
Ohio).193 The JPML has power over all cases in federal courts, and its
decisions to transfer are not limited by personal jurisdiction
180. Petition for Damages & Injunctive Relief, La. Dep’t of Health v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. U61638 (La. Dist. Ct. Sept. 20, 2017).
181. Complaint, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-cv-01808 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 13, 2018).
182. Mississippi v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 3:2017cv00268 (S.D. Miss. filed Apr. 14,
2017) (removed to federal court from Chancery Court 1st Judicial District).
183. State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1722-CC10626 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed June 29, 2017).
184. Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. ADU-2017-949 (Mont. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 30, 2017).
185. New Hampshire v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:17-cv-00427-PB (D.N.H. filed
Sept. 15, 2017).
186. Complaint for Violation of the New Jersey False Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 2A: 32C1, et seq., As Well As Other Claims, Porrino v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. MID-C-16217 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Oct. 5, 2017).
187. State ex rel. Balderas v. Purdue Pharma, No. D-101-CV-2017-0254 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. 2017); see also New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. Purdue Pharma, 323 F. Supp. 1242,
1253 (D.N.M. 2018) (remanding removed state case back to state court and denying
defendants’ motion for stay pending the outcome of the opioid MDL proceeding).
188. Complaint, State ex rel. Schneiderman v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 1, 2018).
189. Complaint, State ex rel. Stein v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 17CV015532 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2017).
190. Complaint, State ex rel. DeWine v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2017CL261 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. May 31, 2017).
191. Complaint, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2017-CP-400-4872 (S.C. Ct. Com.
Pl. Aug. 15, 2017).
192. Complaint for Injunctive & Other Relief Under the Consumer Protection Act,
RCW 19.86, Public Nuisance, & Negligence, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (Wash.
Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2017).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (“[S]uch actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”).

2019]

MDL IMMUNITY

225

considerations.194 While it takes geography into account, sometimes,195 it is
not constrained by it.196 In the case of the opioid MDL, the JPML considered
geography and picked a district nearby.197 But it only focused on proximity
to defendants, not plaintiffs or witnesses.198 Even if the JPML had considered
plaintiffs, as it sometimes does, it might have focused on current plaintiffs,
rather than potential plaintiffs that might file suit at some later point in time.
As we saw, the early filers geographically clump in the Appalachian region,
close to Ohio.199 Later filers do not. They are spread all over the country just
as the opioid epidemic has spread all over the country. For many,
consequently, the opioid MDL takes place in a distant forum.
Distance has numerous consequences.200 The farther away the courthouse
where a case is litigated, the less of a practical opportunity for parties to
attend, for the local public and press to observe proceedings, and for
witnesses to testify.201 For example, the county commissioners of a west coast
county might find it difficult and expensive to periodically travel all the way
to the Northern District of Ohio to see in person how the litigation is

194. See Bradt, supra note 9, at 1165–66 (“Surprisingly, despite the fact that the MDL
court is where all of the action in these cases typically happens, that court need not
have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs or the defendants under the rules that
would apply were the cases being litigated one-by-one.”); Dodson, supra note 109, at
1463 (“Lower courts operate on the assumption that, in both ordinary venue-transfer
cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and multidistrict-litigation cases under § 1407(a),
personal-jurisdiction concerns for plaintiffs simply do not apply.”); Maryellen
Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 62 (1984).
195. See generally Daniel A. Richards, Note, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311,
330–32 (2009) (conducting an empirical analysis of factors considered by the JPML
when choosing transferee court).
196. See generally Bradt, supra note 46, at 787 (“The JPML considers a variety of
factors . . . from the experience of the particular judge in prior MDLs . . . [to the]
motivation of the transferee judge.”).
197. Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 3.
198. Id. at 4 (“The Northern District of Ohio presents a geographically central and
accessible forum that is relatively close to defendants’ various headquarters in New
York, Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Indeed, one of the Big Three
distributor defendants, Cardinal Health, is based in Ohio.”).
199. See supra Figure 4.
200. See generally Roger Michalski, Transferred Justice: An Empirical Account of Federal
Transfers in the Wake of Atlantic Marine, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1289, 1320 (2016) (advocating
for transfer standards that protect vulnerable litigants in sensitive subject areas).
201. See Chamblee Burch, supra note 9, at 670 (noting the benefits of centralization but
also stressing the “countervailing concerns of the traditional, geographic community”).
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proceeding.202 If the same case was litigated down the street in a local
courthouse, they might view things differently. Distance, as such, might
shift control over litigation away from clients to attorneys, and, as we have
seen, likely other people’s attorneys.203
Beyond travel woes, there are additional reasons to worry about
proximity. Opioid abuse is a national problem, but its effects and conditions
of growth are inherently localized. Similarly, the ability of a local
government to respond to the opioid epidemic is inherently tied up with
localized and often idiosyncratic governing abilities, powers, and fiscal
limitations.204 This variation will call for non-common discovery on a
volume that the MDL will not be able to handle efficiently or quickly.205
Similarly, since MDL transfers are for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial
purposes only, the governing choice of law does not change when a case is
included in MDL.206 In other words, the opioid litigation MDL contains
cases that are governed by all kinds of different state law.207 Since discovery
needs are tied to substantive law and since the substantive law varies
202. See generally Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998) (“[T]he time and
energy required to [participate in] a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level,
where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace.”).
203. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Participation and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 513,
514 (2015) (“[T]hese [MDL] cases are transferred to districts far away from the place
where they were originally filed and are run by a plaintiffs’ management committee.”).
204. See Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local
Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3325401
[https://perma.cc/2GUN-HX76?type=image] (providing a review of existing studies
on the financial impact of the opioid epidemic and noting shortcomings of those
studies in quantifying costs for local governments).
205. The MDL court has been working with so-called fact sheets that government
entity plaintiffs must fill out to gain a better understanding of various claims and
defenses. One function of these fact sheets is to serve as a proxy for individualized
discovery and to lay the groundwork for a global settlement. See Fact Sheet
Implementation Order at 1–2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638.
206. See generally Bradt, supra note 46, at 762–63 (noting the growing conflict
between choice of law and efficiency as MDLs increasingly focus on the group rather
than the individual cases); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 547, 579 (1996) (“Choice of law defines the parties’ rights. States differ about
what those rights should be. Such differences are what a federal system is all about.
They are not a ‘cost’ of the system; they are not a flaw in its operation. They are its
object, something to be embraced and affirmatively valued.”).
207. See e.g., Order at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2018), ECF No. 1218 (directing the parties to “address[] the
viability of statutory and/or common law claims for public nuisance in each State and
territory where any MDL plaintiff is located”). There are, of course, also federal causes
of actions that many plaintiffs allege that do not vary from case to case.
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tremendously, so do the discovery needs of many member cases in the
opioid MDL.208 Local judges familiar with local substantive law examining
local witnesses will be in a better position than an MDL proceeding to
provide for such individualized discovery in a nearby location accessible to
local witnesses.209
D. Settlements
These features of distant, slow, and piece-meal litigation also encourage
settlements at the expense of on-the-merits adjudication.210 Plaintiffs who
refuse to settle remain stuck in distant MDL proceedings that they cannot
control with little hope to return to his or her home court. Unless a
plaintiff is in no hurry to resolve a matter and is willing to by-and-large
accept the pretrial litigation decisions of somebody else’s attorney, they
have little choice but to accept poor settlement offers.211 With class actions
in decline, the federal judiciary increasingly utilizes MDLs as an alternative
procedural vehicle to aggregate a large number of cases and bring them to
efficient resolution, which often means settlement.212 MDL proceedings
are often structured with settlement, rather than litigation in mind.213 MDL

208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”).
209. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV.
399, 404 (2014) (“[C]onsidering statewide classes and conducting trials in affected
communities can ease the regulatory mismatch between defendants’ behavior, which affects
citizens nationwide; transferee courts, which have nationwide authority over pretrial matters
only; and a state’s laws, which govern defendants’ conduct toward its citizens.”).
210. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (stating that an MDL “creates the perfect
conditions for an aggregate settlement”).
211. See, e.g., DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152–55 (D. Mass.
2006) (highlighting the although a settlement may be preferred over a lengthy trial with no
guarantee of a favorable outcome, the “marginalization of juror fact finding perversely and
sharply skews the MDL bargaining process in favor of defendants”).
212. See Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class
Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1741 (2017) (comparing Rule 23’s check on
judicial discretion to the power afforded MDL judges); Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing
Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346–47 (2014)
(“As reliance on Rule 23 has diminished, MDL has ascended as the most important
federal procedural device to aggregate (and settle) mass torts.”); Thomas E. Willging
& Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort
Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 806 (2010) (noting the reduction in class
certifications granted relative to the increase in products liability MDLs).
213. See Chamblee Burch & Williams, supra note 121, at 1504; Rave, supra note 70,
at 2177 (noting various mechanisms that “tend to strongly encourage claimants to
accept the deal and provide opportunities for defendants to back out if too few do”).
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judges are encouraged to “make the most of [the] opportunity and
facilitate the settlement of the federal and any related state cases.”214
That seems to be the case in the opioid MDL. 215 From the beginning,
the court was skeptical of trials 216 and focused on settlement. 217 The
judge in charge of the opioid MDL indicated that he believes the JPML
panel picked him because of his ability to facilitate settlements and
avoid trials. 218 Instead of “a whole lot of finger pointing . . . depositions,
and discovery, and trials,” 219 the court would seek to eliminate barriers
to a “global resolution.” 220
Most of the litigation activity in the first year was centered on the
handful of “litigation track” cases that were being prepared for trial.
However, even this limited focus on trial for a few cases was designed
primarily and explicitly with global settlement in mind.221 The court
seemed to hope that a few bellwether cases would facilitate settlement of
all cases prior to them receiving individualized discovery attuned to the

214. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 119, § 20.132 (“One of the
values of multidistrict proceedings is that they bring before a single judge all of the
federal cases, parties, and counsel comprising the litigation. They therefore afford a
unique opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement. Few cases are remanded
for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court. As a transferee
judge, it is advisable to make the most of this opportunity and facilitate the settlement
of the federal and any related state cases.”).
215. See generally Howard Erichson, MDL and the Allure of Sidestepping Litigation, 53
GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3371209 [https://perma.cc/FG5J-URZD?type=image] (“The
judge overseeing the opioids MDL took an unusually aggressive pro-settlement stance
from the start.”).
216. Teleconference Transcript, supra note 125, at 37 (“I have had two substantial MDLs,
and I know that you can’t try your way out of them, even though we have excellent lawyers.”).
217. Referring to a possible settlement, Judge Polster explained that “my objective
is to get my hands around this and see if there is some—maybe some framework for
some resolution, and if so, it is much more preferable to have more cases in the
MDL . . . .” Id. at 15.
218. Id. at 42–43 (recording statement of Judge Polster that the “best use of [his]
time and [his] abilities” would be to come to a resolution between the parties and
expressing that he thinks that is why the JPML chose him for this case).
219. Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Dan A. Polster United States District
Judge and before the Honorable David A. Ruiz United States Magistrate Judge at 4, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58.
220. Minutes of 3/6/2018 Conference & Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Mar. 07, 2018), ECF No. 170 (noting that
barriers “to a global resolution” prompted the establishment of a “limited litigation
track, including discovery, motion practice, and bellwether trials”).
221. Case Management Order One, supra note 116, at 1 (creating a litigation track
because the parties requested one to aid in their settlement discussions).
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local causes, harm, and effects of the opioid epidemic in the
jurisdiction of the local government plaintiffs. 222
This raises the fear that this wave of opioid litigation will end like the
last one. In cases in West Virginia,223 Kentucky,224 California,225 Illinois, 226
Massachusetts, 227 and a host of other states,228 many of the same
defendants settled cases in the past without admitting wrongdoing and
without disclosing to the public the scope and dangers of opioid abuse.

222. Id.
223. See Eric Eyre, 2 Drug Distributors to Pay $36M to Settle WV Painkiller Lawsuits,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/
health/drug-distributors-to-pay-m-to-settle-wv-painkiller-lawsuits/article_b43534bdb020-5f56-b9f3-f74270a54c07.html [https://perma.cc/6ZTX-83F7] (reporting on
settlement reached between West Virginia and drug suppliers Cardinal Health and
Amerisourcebergen for a combined $36 million in January 2017, with no fault
admitted); Landon Thomas Jr., Maker of OxyContin Reaches Settlement with West Virginia,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/business/makerof-oxycontin-reaches-settlement-with-west-virginia.html (detailing West Virginia ex rel.
McGraw v. Purdue Pharma L.P settlement reached in November 2004 worth $10
million, with no fault admitted).
224. See Verdict & Settlement Summary, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. 07-CI-01303 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015), 2015 WL 10458548 (settling claims of
misrepresentation on Dec.23, 2015 for $24 million and no fault admitted).
225. See Nate Raymond, Teva to Pay $1.6 Million to Resolve California Counties’ Opioid
Case, Reuters (May 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/healthteva/teva-to-pay-1-6-million-to-resolve-california-counties-opioid-caseidUSL1N1IR1W3 [https://perma.cc/8T6F-FYNW] (documenting settlement between
two California counties and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries for $1.6 million in May
2017, with no fault admitted).
226. See Verdict & Settlement Summary, Madigan v. Insys Therapeutics Inc., No.
2016CH11216 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 22, 2017), 2017 WL 9473206 (settling claims of
unlawful marketing on August 22, 2017 for $4.5 million with no fault admitted).
227. See Healey v. Insys Therapeutics Inc., No. 17-3207D, 2017 WL 7725486 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2017) (settling claims of illegal marketing and bribery on October 5, 2017
for $500,000 with no fault admitted).
228. See Shannon Hensen, Purdue Pharma Settles with States Over OxyContin, LAW360 (May
8, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/24311/purdue-pharma-settles-withstates-over-oxycontin [https://perma.cc/HPZ6-DHLU] (reporting on claims settled by
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia for $19.5 million in May 2007).
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Federal 229 and foreign lawsuits 230 fared better in some ways. These cases
remind us about the dangers of settlements that do little to stem the
tide of opioid addiction and abuse.
Litigation has the potential to educate the public on the causes and
effects of the opioid epidemic and shed light on the role some
pharmaceutical companies and distributors have played in this crisis.
As such, a key aim of many of the government plaintiffs in the opioid
MDL is not solely recovery for past harms, but many also stress the
importance of public disclosure as a litigation goal to educate the
public they represent. 231 However, little discovery has taken place so
far in this MDL (in part because of the early focus on settlements). The
court has interdicted discovery of keen public interest. For example,
the court has refused to allow discovery into third-party litigation
financing. 232 What little discovery there has been has not been

229. See, e.g., United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572–73,
576 (W.D. Va. 2007) (settling lawsuit over misbranding of pharmaceuticals on July 23,
2007 with Purdue paying $600 million and Purdue’s corporate officers paying a total
of $34.5 million); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES V. MCKESSON CORPORATION
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/928471/download [https://perma.cc/C8BC-H4XH] (settling claims of
improper sales monitoring under the Controlled Substances Act on January 5, 2017
for $150 million and an admission that defendants failed to report suspicious orders);
Cardinal Health Inc., Agrees To Pay $34 Million To Settle Claims That it Failed to Report
Suspicious Sales Of Widely-Abused Controlled Substances, COLO. U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
(Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/co/news/2008/October08/
10_2_08.html [https://perma.cc/S2H9-MJHA] (settling allegations that Cardinal
Health violated federal reporting standards of the Controlled Substances Act for $34
million). But see United States v. Mallinckrodt LLC, 2017 WL 6502139 (N.D.N.Y. July
11, 2017) (settling claims of failing to report suspicious orders of pharmaceutical drugs
on July 11, 2017 for $35 million with no fault admitted).
230. See, e.g., OxyContin Maker Settles Canadian Class Action for C$20m, BBC NEWS
(May 2, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39773354 [https://
perma.cc/9VXP-YSJE] (discussing a Canada-wide class action against Purdue Pharma
that settled for C$20 million in 2017).
231. See, e.g., Commonwealth’s Pre-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 18, at 5
(“The Attorney General is the Commonwealth’s lawyer, and the people of
Massachusetts should be allowed to see the allegations brought on their behalf. The
Defendants’ deceptive sales tactics injured people across the Commonwealth, and the
people of Massachusetts deserve to know the truth.”). See generally Barry Meier, Hold
Makers of Opioids Accountable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2018, at A19 (“Forcing the opioid
industry to reveal the truth is likely to take years, but it could prevent a similar
catastrophe in the future.”).
232. Order Regarding Third-Party Contingent Litigation Financing at 1, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2018), ECF No.
383 (stating that the court will not permit discovery into third-party contingent
litigation financing, including “any agreement under which any person . . . has a right
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disclosed to the public. 233 The court has also excoriated the public
officials whose lawyers are in the MDL by indicating that information
gained during discovery must not be publicly discussed. 234 Most of the
discovery related to opioid pharmaceutical companies comes to the
public from state court proceedings, not the federal opioid MDL. 235
As the court overseeing the federal opioid MDL argued, disclosure
would “contradict the bedrock principle that discovery is a private
process, the sole purpose of which is to assist trial preparation and, in
this case, global settlement discussions.” 236 I will leave aside the
question whether discovery in some cases might be a private process.
However, it cannot be in this case. Not only is the subject matter of extreme
public concern, but most of the litigants are representing the public.237 In
some instances, protective orders preventing public disclosure of specific
pieces of information might, of course, be warranted. But these episodes
suggest that the pressures of the MDL process toward settlement might
systematically skew the process toward privacy at the cost of public
education, public participation, and public benefit.238
E. Quasi-Sovereigns
The concerns about distant and private proceedings so far have
primarily focused on calculations of costs and benefits. However, there
is also a more foundational reason to value local adjudication: most of
the plaintiffs in this MDL are not ordinary litigants. Instead, the brunt
of this MDL is comprised of counties and cities that represent sections of
the public at large that are trying to protect their government police
powers.239 Some local government litigants feel that they have an inherent

to receive compensation that is contingent on and sourced from any proceeds of an
MDL Case, by settlement, judgment, or otherwise”).
233. See, e.g., Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2019), ECF No. 1360 (highlighting that the MDL had
“generated a great deal of media attention” and that the court had “no intention of
preventing the public officials who have filed these cases, the corporate defendants, or the
lawyers representing any party from discussing” this information with the media, but also
noting that “it is imperative that this case be tried in the courtroom, and not in the media”).
234. Id. at 1–2.
235. See, e.g., Barry Meier, High-Dose OxyCotin Sales Strategy is Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2019 at B1, B6 (reporting on information gained in a Massachusetts state court case).
236. Order & Opinion at 11, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio June 26, 2018), ECF No. 800 (emphasis added).
237. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Roger Michalski, The Clash of Procedural Values, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
61, 63 (2018) (identifying different procedural values and tradeoffs among them).
239. See supra Part I (describing the types of litigants in the opioid MDL).
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and implicit right to local adjudication240 in furtherance of dispute
resolution mechanisms that reflect and enhance democratic principles.241
Sub-state government units like counties, municipalities, and submunicipal units (e.g., school boards) exist in a netherworld of neither
being fully sovereign nor fully detached from sovereignty. They are
clearly not full sovereigns like states or the federal government.242 For
example, counties243 and municipalities244 cannot invoke sovereign
immunity and counties are treated as citizens of their states for federal
diversity jurisdiction purposes.245 Still, local governments exert massive
influence over the lives of their populations on a day-to-day, intimate, and
invasive level rarely matched by state or federal governments. From sheriff
departments to firefighters, prosecutors and public defenders, school
boards, election boards, local jails, zoning commissions, county courts, and
water boards, local governments have the power to do tremendous good
and tremendous harm. Additionally, counties and municipalities are often
the instrumentalities for the work state sovereigns and the federal
sovereign try to accomplish. 246 As such, local governments invoke,

240. See, e.g., Andrew Joseph, Why Houston and Other Cities Want Nothing to do with the
Massive National Opioid Lawsuit, STAT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.statnews.
com/2018/03/27/houston-national-opioid-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/K2QZ-85YP]
(quoting a Houston prosecutor as stating that Houston’s lawsuit should be tried in the
county’s own court before the county’s own judge and jury).
241. See Mullenix, supra note 13, at 564 (“[T]he argument may be made that the
new models of nonclass aggregate dispute resolution represent an even more
compelling illustration of the death of democratic dispute resolution.”).
242. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (“Political subdivisions of
States—counties, cities, or whatever—never were and never have been considered as
sovereign entities.”).
243. See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cty., 547 U.S. 189, 197 (2006) (“Because
the County has failed to demonstrate that it was acting as an arm of the State when it
operated the Causton Bluff Bridge, the County is not entitled to immunity from
Northern’s suit.”); Jinks v. Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 466 (2003) (“[M]unicipalities,
unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit.”). See
generally Denise Gilman, Calling the United States’ Bluff: How Sovereign Immunity
Undermines the United States’ Claim to an Effective Domestic Human Rights System, 95 GEO.
L.J. 591, 610 (2007) (“Local government entities, such as counties, municipalities, and
districts, do not enjoy the same blanket sovereign immunity applicable to states.”).
244. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280–81
(1977) (per curiam) (holding that the school board is not an “arm of the state” and,
therefore, does not qualify for immunity).
245. See Moor v. Cty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698 (1973) (reversing the lower court’s
“holding that the County is not a citizen of California for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction”).
246. See generally Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
839 (2017) (“States abdicate many of their federal responsibilities to local governments.”).
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controversially, a kind of quasi-sovereign power,247 and courts have granted
them a kind of local sovereign immunity.248 Whatever the overall wisdom
of this approach, courts recognized that local governments have a special
role in our system of government by linking full sovereigns to the daily lives
of large swaths of the overall population.249
The opioid MDL is inherently tied up with these vital local
government functions, and many local governments have elected to
protect their populations through litigation. In a democratic system, it
is up to the populations of these local governments to judge whether
their leaders chose wisely or not and whether the benefits of litigation
warranted the costs. But in the context of the opioid MDL, local leaders
and their attorneys are not in charge of important decisions.250 Instead, a
remote and unaccountable set of other people’s attorneys are making
consequential decisions on behalf of other counties, cities, and Native
American tribes. Insofar as their decisions will shape outcomes, this
represents a kind of commandeering of government decision-making by
one local government over another local government. This raises a bucket
of thorny philosophical, political, and practical puzzles about the scope of
democratic accountability, rights to local self-determination, and intraand inter-state local government subsidies, taxes, and priorities.
F. Unpredictable
All of the normative concerns outlined above could be alleviated
within the MDL process. The MDL judge could allow more parties to
file motions. Or he might expedite proceedings. Or the judge could
allow for more discovery and disclose more of it to the public. The
judge could also return more cases earlier to their original transferor
districts where they were originally filed. Or he could create more
tracks in recognition of greater variation among the plaintiffs. 251 Or he
247. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 931, 964 (2010) (“[C]ourts increasingly came to view local governments as
possessing a democratically rooted right to autonomy that situated them as a separate
tier of American federalism-like mini-polities with independent legitimacy rooted in
their election by local constituencies.”).
248. See generally Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409
(2016) (exploring the implications of the “accountability gap” in cases involving
constitutional violations by local officials).
249. See Anderson, supra note 247, at 968.
250. See Redish & Karaba, supra note 13, at 151 (“Measured in terms of autonomy,
paternalism, utilitarianism, or dignitary theories, procedural due process demands
considerably more protection of the individual litigants’ interests than MDL provides.”).
251. See Order, supra note 207 (creating a second track to include more issues and
parties relevant to the MDL outside of the three Track One cases).
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could certify a class. 252 All of these options, and many more, are on the
table because the MDL judge has very broad powers that have
traditionally been yielded in creative ways. All pretrial techniques are
on the table, including dispositive motions. 253
This makes it difficult, in some ways, to criticize MDL proceedings
because any flaw could be remedied or alleviated tomorrow through a
creative or even radical use of pretrial techniques. MDL judges are not
constrained by the usual rules, traditions, and norms of civil procedure
the way that same judge would be in a non-MDL proceeding. 254 This
flexibility is one of the greatest strengths of MDL proceedings, but also
a great flaw because it renders MDL proceedings unpredictable. Every
MDL is different and every MDL might change and be dealt with
differently halfway through. 255 For example, the judge in the opioid
MDL was previously in charge of another MDL case, but stressed the
uniqueness of each, suggesting that an approach that was taken in one
case will likely not work in another. 256 This makes it difficult for parties
to plan ahead, to make predictions, and to compare current settlement
offers to other likely outcomes.
The loosening of the regular constraints on what an MDL judge can
and cannot do has a second downside: regular rules embody a careful
balance of competing interests, including but not limited to judicial

252. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Opioid Lawyers Say Settlement May Hinge on Forcing
Plaintiffs into Class Action, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/legalnewsline/2018/09/27/opioid-lawyers-say-settlement-may-hinge-on-forcingplaintiffs-into-class-action [https://perma.cc/9JHX-FSHB].
253. See generally Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role
of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1270–72 (2017)
(describing the significant power that the MDL judge has over pretrial proceedings);
Tidmarsh & Welsh, supra note 10, at 7–9 (“[E]arly transferee judges asserted the power
to rule on all pretrial motions—including dispositive motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment—that arose during the MDL proceeding”).
254. See generally Gluck, supra note 63 (arguing that MDLs need a national approach
to rules of procedure); David L. Noll, The Rule of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 118
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3371952
[https://perma.cc/9UFW-HNEU?type=image]
(arguing that MDLs lack “guarantees of transparency, public participation, and judicial
review,” making the operations of MDLs unlike those of administrative agencies).
255. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Litigation in
Historical Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 91 (2018) (“Externally imposed
procedures for MDL cases . . . would undermine one of the crucial goals of the drafters
of the statute, who believed that flexibility for individual judges was necessary to adapt
to the endless variety of complicated cases that face the federal courts.”).
256. See, e.g., Teleconference Transcript, supra note 125, at 10 (“Well, each MDL is
different. This one is different than my previous one.”).
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economy. 257 Uncoupling MDL proceedings from this balance frees
MDL judges to be creative, but it also creates the danger that they will
subtly or overtly tilt litigation to further efficiency interests over all
others. 258 None of this is to suggest anything derogatory about the MDL
process in general or the MDL judge here in particular. However, I
argue that the opioid epidemic cases, and cases like it, are not a good
fit for MDL treatment and teach us about massive blind spots in the
MDL statute and doctrine. There is currently no way in MDL litigation
to account for powerful societal and governmental interests that trump
litigation efficiency arguments.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
One way to fix this blind spot is through the new concept of “MDL
immunity.” This doctrinal innovation is one of this Article’s main
contributions. I propose that defined cases by and against government
entities must be exempted from generalized MDL treatment. In contrast to
other immunities that block liability, this is an immunity from a particular
procedural device, namely transfers of cases to a multidistrict litigation
proceeding.259 The best way to accomplish this is through a one-sentence
amendment to the MDL statute (Appendix A). Something close to the
proposed statutory amendment could also be achieved without
congressional action by modifying JPML doctrine or by changing the
practices of MDL judges. However, these alternative approaches would not
be as formalized and predictable as legislative action.
A. Modifying the MDL Statute
The normative concerns outlined above suggest a heightened value for
dispersed local adjudication, in a timely manner, on the merits, targeted
257. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . . should be construed, administered,
and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”).
258. See generally Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing Multidistrict Litigation from the Altar of
Expediency, 1997 BYU L. REV. 821, 821 (“One of the more disturbing developments in our
judicial system in the wake of mass tort and other complex litigation is the willingness of
courts to depart from clear and unbending procedural requirements—thereby sacrificing
key structural protections embodied in those requirements—in the name of judicial
economy or efficiency.”).
259. Because the thrust of this proposal aims at the decision to transfer, see infra
Appendix A, this proposal sidesteps the charge that it is based on a “categorization
error.” See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3354742
[https://perma.cc/S5DT-4NTS?type=image] (arguing “against reform efforts that
target the workings of an MDL once in the hands of a transferee judge” (emphasis added)).
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at the specific and individualized harm suffered in that place, controlled
by that plaintiff (e.g., targeting discovery to their litigation goals), and
providing resident witnesses a chance to participate, all in front of a local
judge and jury that are mindful of local conditions and sensibilities. This
is the exact opposite of what the MDL process typically promises and has
actually delivered in this case thus far.
This result is not surprising because the statutory mandate in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 does not require the JPML to engage in a solicitous inquiry about
the localized litigation needs of government litigants. The statute is
structured to emphasize efficient litigation through centralization. 260 The
JPML in the context of the opioid epidemic, as elsewhere, has lived up to
the statutory mandate.
One way to address the heightened need for local adjudication is to
exempt government litigants from MDL proceedings. This would
guarantee that government litigants are not swept up into distant
MDLs. This solution protects the special instrumentalist and
deontological reasons for localized adjudication outlined above. 261 A
government that contemplates suit would be guaranteed local
adjudication without risk that the JPML engages in a vague case-by-case
analysis of whether transfer of a case would “promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions.” 262 As such, the proposed solution
would create an immunity from MDL transfer orders. The JPML would
no longer have the power to order the consolidation or coordination
for pre-trial purposes of actions involving government litigants.
This type of immunity sets it apart from immunities in the past that
are immunities from liability. 263 Such immunities come and came in
many forms. 264 Some are well known: sovereign immunity, tribal
sovereign immunity,265 foreign sovereign immunity,266 international

260. JPML RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 3.3 (centralizing proceedings, such
as by requiring all pleadings to originally be filed with the MDL panel).
261. See supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
263. See infra notes 272–75 (providing examples of other immunities from liability).
264. See infra notes 272–75.
265. See generally Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014)
(“Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess—subject to congressional
action—is the ‘common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers.’” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978))); Katherine
J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal
Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 619 (2010) (“Despite the murkiness of tribal sovereign
immunity’s origins, it has a fairly long history of recognition in federal law.”).
266. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11.
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organizations immunities, 267 judicial immunity,268 arbitrator immunity, 269
prosecutor immunity,270 and numerous criminal immunities (e.g.,
transactional immunity).271 Some are less-well known: immunity for death
certificate completion related to recording the sex of the descendent, 272
immunity for volunteers to nonprofits or government bodies in various
circumstances,273 clerical immunity for entering or refusing to enter
judgment by default,274 and immunities arising out of the handling of
loaned property by museums. 275 And some immunities are no longer
popular, for example: interspousal tort immunity, 276 interfamily
immunity, and charitable immunity. 277 All of these immunities, and
many more, absolve defendants from liability. 278 Courts disagree
267. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 288–288j (“The President shall be authorized . . . to withhold or
withdraw . . . privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided for in this subchapter.”).
268. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam) (“A long line of this
Court’s precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for
money damages.”); Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (“A judge loses absolute immunity only when he acts in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.”).
269. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200(f) (West 2019) (“In any arbitration or
mediation conducted pursuant to this article by the State Bar or by a local bar association,
pursuant to rules of procedure approved by the board of trustees, an arbitrator or
mediator . . . shall have the same immunity which attaches in judicial proceedings.”).
270. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985) (“Full immunity also has been
given to federal and state prosecutors.”); Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that IRS tax attorneys who were performing “official conduct representing the
government in the litigation in the Tax Court” were entitled to absolute immunity).
271. See, e.g., Furs v. Superior Court, 3 A.3d 912, 915 (Conn. 2010) (“Transactional
immunity ‘protects a witness from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled
testimony relates.’” (quoting United States v. Nanni, 59 F.3d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1995))).
272. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 102875(a)(1)(D) (West 2019) (“A person
completing the death certificate in compliance . . . is not liable for any damages or costs
arising from claims related to the sex of the decedent as entered on the certificate of death.”).
273. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05 (2012).
274. See, e.g., Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002) (dismissing a
claim against a court clerk on absolute immunity grounds).
275. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1899.6(b) (West 2019).
276. Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65, 70 (Cal. 1962) (en banc) (permitting one spouse to bring
an intentional against the other, overruling prior precedent that barred such actions).
277. See generally Jill R. Horwitz, The Multiple Common Law Roots of Charitable Immunity:
An Essay in Honor of Richard Epstein’s Contributions to Tort Law Scholarship, 3 J. TORT L.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2010) (explaining the history of charitable immunity).
278. See generally Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All but the Plainly
Incompetent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2012)
(“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state officials from individual liability for
violations of constitutional rights if the test for immunity is met.”); Karen Blum et al.,
Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633
(2013) (discussing the recent expansion of absolute immunity).
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whether immunity voids liability once liability is established or whether
“the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to
have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.” 279
In contrast to these substantive immunities of the past, I propose the
creation of a new procedural immunity. This immunity would exempt
a class of litigants from a procedural device. The MDL transfer statute
already contains a comparable provision. Actions by the United States
under antitrust laws are categorically exempt from MDL treatment. 280
Elsewhere, procedure is also mindful of the special litigation needs of
government litigants.281 For example, the United States receives special
protections for default judgment,282 extended time-allowances in
pleadings,283 and protections from offensive non-mutual issue
preclusion.284 In short, it is consistent with past practice to incorporate
blanket protections into procedural rules (including the MDL statute itself)
that take into account the litigation position of government litigants.
B. Choices
There are many ways to implement an immunity provision, whether
substantive or procedural in nature. This Section discusses some of
these choices and recommends an immunity configuration consistent
with the normative concerns and the empirical description outlined above.
All of these choices have been incorporated into the statutory language
proposed in Appendix A. Of course, somebody might agree with the need
for some type of MDL immunity without agreeing with all of the choices
made here. As such, this section presents a menu of regulatory levers to
fine-tune MDL proceedings that relate to the concerns outlined above. On
279. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985). But see Williams v. State, 664 P.2d
137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). “[T]he immunity cart” should not be improperly
“placed before the duty horse.” Id. (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d
894, 894 (Cal. 1982)). Put differently, “the question of the applicability of a statutory
immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a
duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) (2012) (“Nothing in this section shall apply to any
action in which the United States is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws.”).
281. See generally Roger Michalski, Trans-Personal Procedures, 47 CONN. L. REV. 321
(2014) (discussing procedural differences between different types of entities).
282. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d) (“A default judgment may be entered against the United
States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right to
relief by evidence that satisfies the court.”).
283. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(2) (allowing a United States governmental entity to
respond within 60 days instead of 21).
284. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 164 (1984) (holding “that the Court of
Appeals was wrong in applying nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government”).
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the whole, I advocate here for broad-blanket rules that would be easier to
administer, would be more predictable, and would decrease the chance of
doctrinal drift over time.
The first choice to make when designing an MDL procedural
immunity is to determine the scope: who and what is covered by the
immunity? The immunity could only cover clear sovereigns like the
government of the United States and States.285 Or it could cover these
sovereigns as well as their agencies, corporations, officers, and employees. Or
it could go further still and include U.S. territories and sub-state government
entities like counties and county-equivalents (e.g., parishes in Louisiana),
municipalities, and sub-municipal entities (e.g., police departments). Of
particular importance is the treatment of federally recognized tribes.
I propose that the MDL immunity cover all government litigants.
This is a broad articulation that captures tremendous variation. Some
may be skeptical as to whether a sub-municipal government unit
should be treated with the same deference in MDL matters as a mighty
federal government agency. Perhaps, some might argue that the
difference between all of these government entities is too great to
warrant equal MDL immunity.
Notice, however, that MDL immunity is a commitment to recognize
differences between government units rather than to treat different
government units equally. In MDL proceedings, all but a handful of cases
are mere onlookers. They are equally onlookers no matter their
governing responsibilities, exposure to harm, litigation resources, or
initiative. MDL immunity would break up this uniform treatment and
guarantee that all of these government units could litigate in their home
forums in ways that are mindful of local needs and conditions.
The second choice to make is whether to focus on government litigants
solely on the plaintiff side, the defendant side, or both.286 My proposal
includes all government litigants. The normative concerns outlined above
arose in litigation where the government units are plaintiffs, but many of
the same arguments could also apply to where the government units are
defendants. Notably, a common law legal system works best when
decisions percolate up through the system from numerous starting points,

285. I focus here on domestic government litigants only because suits against
foreign governments are fairly rare, unlikely to end up in MDL proceedings, and
subject to additional requirements. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (immunizing foreign
states from MDL jurisdiction in most circumstances).
286. Cf. § 1407(g) (“Nothing in this section shall apply to any action in which the
United States is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws.” (emphasis added)).
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each generating more discovery, arguments, and counter-arguments. 287
Another reason to prefer an inclusive party-role definition is the
possibility of counter claims. Assume for a moment that we created an
MDL immunity that exempted government defendants from MDL
treatment, but not government plaintiffs. Now, imagine one of these
government plaintiffs files suit, the defendant asserts a mandatory
counter-claim,288 and the case with both the claim and counter-claim is
swept into an MDL. In such a situation, the JPML would have to leave the
original claim in the MDL but separate the related counter-claim and
remand it to local proceedings. 289
A third choice in designing an MDL immunity concerns limiting the
immunity by subject matter. 290 For example, somebody might believe
that some type of MDL immunity is warranted but only in specific types
of lawsuits, for example, civil rights cases. Perhaps MDL immunity is
warranted in public law disputes but should not apply to private law
litigation. The current limitation on MDL treatment contained in section
1407(g) is such a mixture of party limitation (“United States”) and subject
matter limitation (“antitrust laws”). I did not include such a subject-matter
limitation in the proposal because I find it difficult to predict the shape of
future lawsuits. Most people twenty-five years ago would not have been
able to anticipate an opioid MDL with hundreds of local government
plaintiffs in it. A narrow focus in MDL immunities would likely leave out
subject matters that at some point in the future need to be shielded from
generalized MDL treatment involving governments.
The last choice in crafting an MDL immunity asks us to consider how
durable the immunity should be. Is MDL immunity, like many
substantive immunities, waivable? If it is waivable, then what would
constitute wavier? Must it be invoked? When and how? Can waiver
occur only explicitly or also implicitly? Can it only be waived in
litigation or can it be waived pre-suit? (e.g., by a contract provision
287. See Bradt & Clopton, supra note 26, at 922 (“[T]here may be systemic benefits from
multiple decisions by multiple judges arising from arguments by multiple lawyers.”).
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (“A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the
time of its service—the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”).
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“[T]he panel may separate any claim, cross-claim,
counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the
remainder of the action is remanded.”).
290. See generally David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in
Federal Civil Procedure, 2010 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 371 (2010) (“[T]he Federal Rules, at least on
the surface, offer a procedural canvass of stunning simplicity.”); David Marcus, TransSubstantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2014) (discussing
how some legal doctrines are similarly applied across different areas of substantive law).
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related to a pharmaceutical company providing opioids to the county
hospital). Similarly, is waiver never revocable or could there be
situations where parties get a second bite at the immunity apple?
These questions, and many more, arise as soon as MDL immunity
becomes anything other than automatic, self-executing, and nonwaivable. Any of these features would introduce unpredictability, costly
immunity satellite litigation, and the potential for sophisticated legal
entities to take advantage of inexperienced parties (e.g., a small county
without a permanent legal staff). Common law interpretations of
“consent to MDL treatment” might also unduly shift over time in favor
of repeat litigants. 291 To counter all of these dangers, the proposed
MDL immunity is not waivable.
This might seem like a harsh and overly broad provision of the rule.
However, keep in mind that section 1407 is not the sole transfer statute.
Section 1404 provides another way to transfer cases with party consent.292
Determined parties can thus still have their cases transferred for litigation
elsewhere. Once there, such a case could be consolidated with other
similarly situated cases.293 A 1404 transfer has different up and downsides
from a 1407 transfer, but could accomplish some of the same efficiency
benefits.294 As such, the existence of alternative transfer possibilities
cushions the blow of the proposed strict MDL immunity provision.

291. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (discussing the similarities and differences
between claimants with only “occasional recourse to the courts” and claimants who are
“repeat players” regularly engaged in litigation).
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all
parties have consented.”).
293. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (“If actions before the court involve a common
question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at
issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid
unnecessary cost or delay.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation,
Community, and the Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 916 (2010) (discussing the
benefits of plaintiffs voluntarily associating and coordinating litigation activity).
294. For example, 1404, in contrast to 1407, would not only transfer cases for pretrial matters but for all matters, including trial. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (“For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”), with 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” (emphasis added)).
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C. Which Tool
MDL immunity, in some form, could be accomplished through four
tools: the MDL statute, amendment of substantive law statutes, JPML
doctrine, or changed practices by MDL judges. Modifying the MDL
statute is the most difficult path. The statute has not been modified since
its initial enactment in 1968. 295 However, it is also the path that establishes
the most predictability and certainty. Alternatively, Congress could
modify substantive statutes to include provisions that prevent MDL
transfers in those types of cases (e.g., securities). 296
Modifying JPML doctrine could accomplish roughly the same
outcome by reinterpreting the words “just and efficient conduct of
such actions” to include an exception for government litigants.
However, that would put a significant amount of weight on the vague
term “just” and arguably go beyond the powers of the JPML. 297 Also,
the Panel has traditionally not produced lengthy opinions that vary greatly
between cases. 298 More commonly, JPML transfer orders tend toward the
brief and formulaic.299 This makes them poor tools to accomplish a
massive sea change in MDL practice. Furthermore, membership on the
JPML is not static and changed membership may bring different views
as to MDL immunity issues. 300
Finally, the least difficult but also least predictable and reliable way
to accomplish a type of MDL immunity would be through changed

295. See Andrew Bradt, The Stickiness of the MDL Statute, 37 REV. LITIG. 203, 205
(2018) (“Because MDL was passed as a statute, and not a rule, and because MDL
ultimately delegated control over MDL’s implementation to the JPML and not the
Rules Committee, it has been relatively difficult to tinker with.”).
296. Civil procedure scholars might also relish the Erie doctrine issues that will abound if
a substantive state law that a plaintiff invokes has things to say that implicate MDL transfers.
297. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168–69 (1993) (imposing heightened pleading standard in a unanimous reversal of
common law doctrine against municipalities explaining that it “must be obtained by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation”); see also Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (“Courts should generally not depart from the Federal Rules’
usual practice based on perceived policy concerns.”).
298. See, e.g., In re MI Windows & Doors, Inc., Prods. Liab. Litig., 857 F. Supp. 2d
1374 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (consolidating 10 cases in a four-page opinion); In re Kugel Mesh
Hernia Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2007)
(consolidating 31 cases in a four-page opinion).
299. See, e.g., Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 3 (consolidating over 100 cases in a
four-page transfer order).
300. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2012) (“The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated . . . by the Chief Justice of
the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit. The concurrence of
four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel.”).
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practices by MDL judges. Any party, the Panel, or the MDL judge can
theoretically initiate a remand of transferred actions back to their original
courts.301 However, it is “typically [] the transferee judge” who initiates
successful remands.302 Normally, “the Panel is reluctant to order a remand
absent the suggestion of the transferee judge.”303 The MDL judge, in
short, could decide at any time that actions by government litigants
should not, or no longer should, be part of the judge’s MDL and initiate
remands of those actions back to their home jurisdictions.304 In the case
of the opioid epidemic, the Panel provided for this possibility in its
original transfer order. 305 The Panel, as it typically does, expressed faith
in the “sound judgment of the transferee judge.” 306 While an MDL
judge might thus be able to accomplish something like MDL immunity
by stubbornly requesting remands of actions involving government
litigants, this tool of reform is unlikely and unstable. 307 MDL judges are
selected by the JPML in significant part because of their ability and
willingness not to remand cases. 308 That is how the judge in the opioid
MDL perceives his selection and mandate. 309 Judges selected, in part,

301. JPML RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 10.1(b) (“Typically, the transferee
judge recommends remand of an action, or a part of it, to the transferor court at
anytime by filing a suggestion of remand with the Panel.”).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 10.3(a); see also Heyburn, supra note 107, at 2235 (“Where the transferee
judge has suggested remand, however, the party seeking to vacate the CRO faces an
uphill battle, as the Panel ‘gives great deference to a transferee judge’s suggestion that
an action pending before [that judge] is ripe for remand.’”).
304. See generally Edward F. Sherman, When Remand is Appropriate in Multidistrict
Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 455, 467 (2014) (“The MDL judge necessarily has broad
discretion in deciding whether remand of cases—either individually or in a group—
will serve the interests of the MDL statute.”).
305. Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that some claims may be more
efficiently handled in the claims’ transferor courts, and in those cases, the MDL judge
should file a suggestion of remand with the Panel).
306. See id. (“As always, we trust such matters to the sound judgment of the
transferee judge.”).
307. Cf. Chamblee Burch, supra note 209, at 402, 422 (arguing that there is “evidence
that a normative shift may be underway” that will make early remand “routine”).
308. See generally Robreno, supra note 149, at 144 (“As a matter of judicial culture,
remanding cases is viewed as an acknowledgment that the MDL judge has failed to
resolve the case, by adjudication or settlement, during the MDL process.”).
309. See Teleconference Transcript, supra note 125, at 42–43 (“I don’t think it is in
anyone’s interest to have this [case] dragging on for five or ten years, which it will if
we don’t come to some resolution. It will easily go that long, and there are a whole lot
of reasons from both sides why that doesn’t make sense, and quite frankly, I think the
best use of my time and my abilities will be to help see if there is some sort of resolution we
can reach. I think that’s why the MDL panel picked me. I am sure there are better trial judges
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on this trait are unlikely to then turn around and request remands for
hundreds of cases with government litigants. Even if some MDL judges
did, others might not. The remand requests of one MDL judge have
no binding force on other and future MDL judges. This renders MDL
immunity based on the practices of MDL judge unpredictable and
unreliable. Modification of section 1407 is the most difficult, but also
the most lasting and stable tool to accomplish a meaningful grant of
MDL immunity to government litigants.
D. Concerns, Problems, Objections
MDL immunity, in whatever form and accomplished through
whatever tool, is not without flaws. This Section will highlight the two
most glaring issues.
First, MDL immunity might take many cases out of MDLs, where they
would have been dealt with efficiently, and create a large number of
duplicative litigation around the country, plowing the same ground
over and over. Some might argue that this is a waste of sparse judicial
resources and will overtax all parties and witnesses involved.310
MDL treatment of properly related cases does make litigation more
efficient and can dramatically cut back on duplicative discovery requests (e.g.,
multiple depositions of a pharmaceutical executive) and pre-trial motions
(e.g., multiple protective orders related to depositions of a pharmaceutical
executive).311 Beyond waste, there is also the danger of inconsistent rulings
(e.g., one court granting the deposition and another court denying it). These
are concerns in any complex litigation, but were particularly on the mind of
the JPML when it created the opioid MDL.312
Nothing in this Article should suggest that there are not important
litigation efficiencies to be gained by MDL treatment. However, there
are also important countervailing considerations that sometimes get
shortchanged. The normative concerns that the opioid epidemic
litigation highlights are a good opportunity to ponder what these
countervailing considerations might be and how they stack up against
in the country, maybe better trial judges right here in my Court, but I think I was picked
for that reason, and that’s where I am going to spend my time.” (emphasis added)).
310. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 111, at 2266–67 (emphasizing the tradeoff between
judicial efficiency and the inconvenience for the parties, particularly those in a distant forum).
311. See, e.g., Bradt & Clopton, supra note 26, at 920 (“A single judge overseeing
consolidated cases is in a better position to police duplicative discovery requests than
scores of judges hearing hundreds of separate cases.”).
312. Transfer Order, supra note 6, at 3 (“The alternative of allowing the various
cases to proceed independently across myriad districts raises a significant risk of
inconsistent rulings and inefficient pretrial proceedings.”).
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efficiency goals. In the end, that necessarily entails a judgment call
between two important sets of competing and inconsistent aims.
Reasonable minds will disagree, but there can be no meaningful
choice if one side of the equation is left out of consideration. In my
mind, the instrumental and quasi-sovereignty arguments for
exempting government litigants are even more important in some
contexts than the important efficiency arguments.
The second major unaddressed objection to giving MDL immunity to
government litigants is that this would raise federalism concerns. Many laws
contribute to a complex fabric of shared, distributed, and delegated
governing responsibilities and powers between and among different layers
of government. Procedural laws are part of that delicate balance. Some
might argue that a grant of MDL immunity would upset that balance.
There are numerous responses to this complex topic. Federalism is,
of course, not static but instead is constantly renegotiated in the face
of new challenges and demands. 313 Insofar as the opioid epidemic
presents such a challenge, perhaps a careful re-calibration of federalism
concerns in the complex litigation context are warranted. Relatedly,
perhaps MDL immunity would not upset a federalism balance but rather
restore it. It is not clear that the MDL statute was designed with cases like
the opioid litigation in mind.314 Conceptualized as a deviation rather than
continuation, federalism concerns in the context of the opioid epidemic
litigation call for a return to localized government litigation. Finally,
whatever federalism concerns exist should not be overvalued. The MDL
statute is not jurisdictional in nature. It does not modify the reach of
federal courts either by granting or stripping powers. Instead, section
1407 is a transfer statute. As such, it only has the power to move cases
from one federal district court to another if there is federal subject
matter jurisdiction. 315 The MDL statute does not and cannot create
such jurisdiction. 316 MDL immunity, as such, would only speak to cases
313. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1996–
97 (2014) (noting changes in federalism over time, including how “[f]ederal law is
now predominantly statutory law, and the reach of federal statutes into areas of historic
state control continues to expand”).
314. See generally Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act
of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017) (arguing that the original purpose of the MDL
statute was to consolidate power in the hands of a few judges who believed they were
better suited to control the impending flood of mass tort litigation).
315. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (allowing a judge to transfer venue to another
“district or division where it might have been brought,” i.e. another court that has
subject matter jurisdiction).
316. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (restricting the MDL panel to remanding the case “to
the district from which it was transferred”).
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that invoke federal jurisdiction while leaving state court proceedings
untouched. MDL immunity could not reallocate power from federal to
state courts because MDL transfers do not have that power either.
CONCLUSION
This is not the first time that the MDL system has faced a massive public
health crisis317 and not the last time that courts will encounter similar issues.
As local governments take on a more active litigation role, they might find
themselves more frequently in federal MDL proceedings. These situations
will raise a bag of thorny legal issues318 and require a full toolset of potential
solutions319 and perspectives.320 MDL immunity could be a device to
317. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation after Amchem
and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1900–01 (2002) (explaining that in the wake of the
asbestos health crisis, thousands of asbestos cases were consolidated in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania with a judge known for “facilitating large-scale settle”); Linda
S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 479 n.13 (1991) (explaining how congress modified the
MDL statute, coincidentally during the asbestos health crisis, to allow for minimal
diversity jurisdiction in the transfer district).
318. For example, preclusion questions between different and subsidiary
government units. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Cities vs. States: A Looming Battle for Control of
High-Stakes Opioid Litigation, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2018, 10:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/28/cities-vs-states-a-loomingbattle-for-control-of-high-stakes-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/9CQS-P58J] (“A
public fight between the Tennessee attorney general and counties that have filed
separate lawsuits against the opioid industry could be the first of many similar conflicts as
state AGs try to assert control over mushrooming litigation over the addiction crisis.”).
Similarly, the search for “global peace” might prove elusive. See generally Morgan McCollum,
Note, Local Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid Multi-District Litigation, N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378794
[https://perma.cc/8TYB-K5FJ?type=image] (emphasizing that only a fraction of all
possible litigants, including potentially 40,000 municipalities, are in the current MDL and
any potential global settlement would have to cover all future litigants). There may also be
legal ethics concerns. See generally Melissa Mortazavi, The Cost of Avoidance:
Pluralism, Neutrality, and the Foundations of Modern Legal Ethics, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
151, 155 (2014) (discussing the general impact of updating the ethics model code
for a modern world).
319. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1992) (discussing how a
new solution for the asbestos health crisis was needed, including “an administrative
alternative [that] may be required and may well be preferable”).
320. Cf. Steven M. Sellers, U.S. Chamber Warns That Cities Are Litigating Too Much,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/u-schamber-warns-that-cities-are-litigating-too-much-1
[https://perma.cc/NY83-NXS7]
(“State legislatures should limit or stop the burgeoning trend of cities and counties hiring
outside counsel to litigate everything from opioid addiction costs to environmental
contamination, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce said.”).
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guarantee, in the opioid litigation and litigation on the horizon, that
efficiency concerns are properly balanced against other social and
governmental interests.
APPENDIX A—MODEL 1407(A)
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to
any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such
transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each
action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided,
however, that the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the
remainder of the action is remanded. The panel may not transfer civil
actions by or against government litigants.
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APPENDIX B—GREYSCALE VERSION OF FIGURE 4
The following Panels show County Governments in MDL #2804 by
filing Window (the original Figure 4 combined all these panels and
coded filing windows with colors).
Panel 1 (before initial 1407 motion):
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Panel 2 (between initial 1407 motion and MDL order):

Panel 3 (first 6 months):
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Panel 4 (7-12 months):

Panel 5 (beyond 12 months):
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